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DELIVERING A COMMUNITY EMPLOYMENT LAW: A 




I. ELUSIVE CONSENSUS: COMMUNITY SOCIAL 
POLICY 
Consensus between member states of the European Union on the 
appropriate general direction of European social policy has always tended 
to be difficult to reach. Notwithstanding the relative broadening and 
deepening of Community social policy in recent years, this continues to be 
so. Freedland’s observation (made in 1996) that there is no single clear or 
accepted policy agenda for employment law in the European Union still 
rings true—as does Shaw’s acknowledgment of the difficulty involved in 
pointing to common themes in Community social policy. 1  
In some respects Community social policy needs to run (or, perhaps one 
should say, ought to have run) in order to stand still. The core project of 
the European Community has, from the time of its inception, been market 
integration. Community rules aimed at market integration have inevitable 
redistributive effects—for example, between more and less efficient 
                                                 
* Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University College Dublin. Amended version of paper 
prepared for the Irish European Law Forum, Tenth Annual Conference, Regulating 
Liberalising Markets and Social Europe: New Governance in the EU, University College, 
Dublin, 19 January 2007. My thanks are offered to my colleague Professor Imelda Maher 
for originally suggesting the topic, to Professor Colin Scott and the other participants in 
the Forum for suggestions on how it might be further developed. 
1 M. Freedland, “Employment Policy” in P. Davies et al, European Labour Law: 
Principles and Perspectives—Liber Amicorum Lord Wedderburn (1996, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford) and J. Shaw, “Twin-Track Social Europe—the Inside Track” in D. O’Keeffe and 
P. Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (1994, Wiley, Chichester) both 
of which are quoted in P. Syrpis “The Integrationist Rationale for European Social 
Policy” in J. Shaw (ed.), Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union 17 at 17. 
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member states, regions, industries and enterprises—and inevitable 
consequences for those who work in affected enterprises or industries. The 
question of how (and indeed whether) the Community should respond to 
the redistributive effects of its own policies is one which poses itself.  
In practice, even when the Community has decided to react by intervening 
in the employment law field, difficulties in bringing about any Community 
response have tended to abound. Market integration is a project which for 
long has been seen to be capable of being achieved—and indeed to a large 
extent has been achieved—by negative integration (i.e., the outlawing of 
national rules which prevent the creation of a single European market). 
Such negative integration is a process which is well capable of being 
destructive of national rules on social protection.2 In theory such national 
rules can be replaced by equivalent European-level norms, protecting the 
same social interests as were formally protected at national level, but the 
reality is that negative integration (involving the judicial condemnation of 
national rules hampering the operation of a European single market, 
absent any justification deemed adequate for such rules) is far easier to 
achieve than the arduous work of positive integration (involving the 
creation of common standards and legal frameworks) in any policy field.  
Indeed, particular considerations applying to social policy make the task 
of positive integration in this field even more difficult. Social policy is an 
area in which integrationist pressures must compete both (i) with 
arguments regarding the retention of sovereignty by member states in a 
whole range of areas touched upon by Community social policy, and (ii) 
with ideological objections relating to e.g., the appropriate role of 
regulation in governing the employer-employee relationship—objections 
which would be themes for debate even were social policy to be regulated 
entirely at national level.   
Analyses have been offered suggesting arguments as to whether the 
Community should have a social policy at all, and offering justifications 
(whether economically-based or rooted in other justifications, such as 
                                                 
2 Note, for example, the influence of the famous Sunday Trading cases saga on United 
Kingdom laws concerning the opening of shops on Sunday, even if those laws were 
ultimately upheld by the European Court of Justice. 
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citizenship or human rights) for any such policy, or whether it should rely 
on regulatory competition between member states in order to establish 
social standards.3 The reality, however, has been that the general path of 
Community social policy, confronted with difficulties such as those 
mentioned above, has not been decided on by reference to such arguments. 
Rather, it has trod along a path of least resistance in relation to issues 
which member states regard, for whatever reason, as sensitive or high-
priority topics. The result has been the creation of an ad hoc and somewhat 
incoherent set of European social policy priorities. These priorities have 
been usefully characterised by Fitzpatrick as a pyramid, with issues given 
the highest priority placed at the top of the pyramid and vice versa. 4 In 
contrast, however, with what would be expected to be the top priorities in 
a genuine social constitution, (in which the highest priority might be given 
to the protection of such values as freedom of association and other 
aspects of collective labour law such as the right to strike, followed 
(perhaps) by such values as social security law and dismissal law) the EU 
social pyramid is represented—not inaccurately—as having its higher tiers 
(where law-making is easiest) dedicated to such issues as worker health 
and safety, employee information and consultation rights and gender 
equality law, its middle tiers (typically involving a requirement of 
unanimous voting for the adoption of norms) dedicated to issues such as 
social security rights and only its lower tiers (in which positive legislation 
has sometimes been precluded by Treaty rules 5) concerned with 
protection for collective rights such as the right of association and the right 
                                                 
3 See for two very useful analyses in this regard, P. Syrpis, loc. cit., and C. Barnard, 
“Regulating Competitive Federalism in the European Union? The Case of EC Social 
Policy” both of which are to be found in J. Shaw, op. cit.. See also e.g., S. Deakin and F. 
Wilkinson, “Rights vs. Efficiency? The Economic Case for Transnational Labour 
Standards” (1994) 23 ILJ 289, P. Davies, “The Emergence of European Labour Law” in 
McCarthy (ed.) Legal Intervention in Industrial Relations: Gains and Losses (Oxford, 
Basil Blackwell, 1992) 344 and such Community documents as the Commission White 
Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment (COM (93)700). 
4 B. Fitzpatrick, “Converse Pyramids and the EU Social Constitution” in Shaw, op. cit., at 
303  
5 Hence Article 137(5) of the EC Treaty. 
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to strike. In each case the determining factor for the relative level of 
priority given to these issues is that 
the higher up a national pyramid a set of laws reside, the more 
cherished they are within that system and the greater will be 
the resistance to their transplantation into equally elevated 
positions within other legal systems. In the context of European 
integration, it therefore requires powerful integrative forces to 
bring about Community competence over the harmonisation of 
(or even minimum guarantees within) particular areas of law. 
The ‘tougher’ the area of law and policy, the less likely it is 
that these integrative forces will be sufficiently powerful.6 
The result of this at European level has been a pyramid of social values 
with an intrinsically converse nature, and “neither a recognisable hierarchy 
of fundamental social rights nor a consistent and coherent system of social 
law has emerged…” 7  
Poiares Maduro has pointed out that the development of social rights in 
the EU “does not come about as a consequence of a political conception of 
the social and economic protection deserved by any European citizen” and 
has observed that “redistribution in the EU occurs as a result of ad hoc 
intergovernmental bargaining and not as a constitutive element of an 
emerging polity founded upon a social contract which includes a criterion 
of distributive justice”.8 The same writer has pointed to the danger that 
without some agreement on a criterion of distributive justice, any 
decisions which the EU makes which have redistributive effects “will be 
                                                 
6 B. Fitzpatrick, loc. cit., at 311. The ‘toughness’ referred to relates to the concept of 
‘tough law’ deployed by Kahn-Freund in his well-known article “On the Uses and 
Misuses of Comparative Law” (1974) 37 MLR 1 to refer to areas such as collective 
labour law. 
7 B. Fitzpatrick, loc. cit., at 316. 
8 M. Poiares Maduro, “Europe’s Social Self: ‘The Sickness Unto Death’” in J. Shaw 
(ed.), op. cit., 325 at 337 and 342. 
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seen as a simple reflection of the balance of power in the EU and as 
lacking general social legitimacy”.9 
The consequences of the inability to create the consensus necessary to 
formulate some kind of vision of the social vocation of the European 
Union may yet be profound. (Poiares Maduro himself has borrowed as a 
metaphor for what he sees as a refusal of the European Union to discuss its 
social self, the Danish philosopher Kierkegaard’s notion—developed in a 
quite different context—of a ‘sickness unto death’.10) On the political 
level, a perception that the contribution of the EU is a negative one in 
social policy terms seems to have been a significant element of the refusal 
of the French electorate to endorse the Constitutional Treaty in 
referendum—an event which serves to underscore, inter alia, the political 
importance which determining the direction of Community social policy 
has. 
All is not doom and gloom for those in favour of an active European social 
policy, however. Partly in consequence of the tensions in this policy field, 
and the difficulty in making progress here, the field of European 
employment law has for long also constituted a testing ground for 
reconceptualisations both of the methods and of the instruments of 
governance at European level. Numerous examples can be given. Those 
interested in the influence of soft law instruments in the law can look to 
the operation and influence both of the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights and, more recently, of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Those interested in the 
operation (and allegedly centripetal force) of enhanced cooperation can 
look to the experience of the Community as regards the operation of the 
Social Policy Agreement and Social Policy Protocol, with the provisions 
of the Agreement now finding themselves substantively reproduced in the 
Social Chapter of the EC Treaty. An early and significant example of the 
                                                 
9 Loc. cit., at p. 348. 
10 The Sickness Unto Death: a Christian Psychological Exposition for Edification and 
Awakening written pseudonymously by S. Kierkegaard sub. nom. Anti-Climacus, 
(English translation 1989, Penguin, Harmondsworth). In essence, the idea is one of a 
human being who refuses to accept the meaning of his of her life. 
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Open Method of Coordination in action was provided by the Employment 
Title (Part 3, Title VIII) of the EC Treaty, mandating a coordinated 
strategy between the  employment. And of course, a radical innovation in 
the field of governance—although by now a well-established one—has 
been the role given to the process of social dialogue in the Maastricht 
Social Policy Agreement, with the relevant provisions now found in 
Articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty.   
 It is intended, in the remainder of this paper, to offer some reflections (of 
somewhat unequal duration, although perhaps justifiably so) on two of the 
most significant methods by which EU governance (for which we may 
read European Community governance) has traditionally been delivered in 
the social policy field, and to reflect on some of the possibilities and 
problems associated therewith. The role of the European social dialogue is 
first examined, followed by an examination of legislation as a policy tool.  
Effectiveness—or ‘output legitimacy’, as it has sometimes been termed—
is of course a central concern in this paper. However, so too is ‘input 
legitimacy’ and the question of. For, as Armstrong has observed, “the 
evolution of EU governance in the field of social policy raises crucial 
constitutional questions about the range of voices and identities heard in 
EU decision-making processes.” 11 
 
II. BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW? 
SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND COMMUNITY SOCIAL POLICY 
Social dialogue generally may be defined as communication activity 
involving social partners which is intended to influence the arrangement 
and development of work-related issues. (In Marxist terminology, it would 
be referred to as ‘class cooperation’, or more pejoratively as ‘class 
collaboration’). At European level, it refers to the various discussions, 
consultations, negotiations and joint initiatives undertaken by the social 
                                                 
11 K. Armstrong, “Governance and the Single European Market” in G. de Búrca and P. 
Craig, The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, Oxford, 1999) 745 at p. 771. 
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partner organisations representing labour, on the one hand, and 
management on the other. It is a process which has been enshrined in 
Articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty since the coming into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, although in reality it has been in existence 
for far longer than this, since these articles replicate provisions formerly 
found in the Social Policy Agreement annexed to the Social Policy 
Protocol annexed to the EC Treaty at Maastricht and in force since 1993.12 
Indeed social dialogue as a process predates even this, deriving its origins 
from the ‘Val Duchesse’ dialogue between the social partners, which 
began in 1985 in the chateau of the same name near Brussels, with the 
enthusiastic encouragement of the Delors Commission and its President.   
Betten has referred to the social dialogue as a “quasi neo-corporatist form 
of social policy law making” 13 and Beirneart has described it as obviously 
paralleling the Belgian industrial relations system, which provides for 
similarly systematic consultation of the social partners, and, if wished, the 
appropriation by them of a dossier via the drawing up of a collective 
agreement.14 Social dialogue ensures that management and labour, as the 
parties most affected by policy initiatives in the employment law field 
have an input into whether policy steps referred to them should be taken in 
the first place, and subsequently into the content of any such proposal.15 
Indeed, under the relevant Treaty provisions, should the social partners 
wish to do so they may actually negotiate the content of the proposal.16 
Considerable autonomy is thus envisaged for the social partners. (Indeed, 
the input of the social partners into the very design of this arrangement 
                                                 
12 Although not for the United Kingdom, at that time. 
13 See L. Betten, “The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community 
Social Policy” (1998) 23 European Law Review 20 at 28. 
14 See W. Beirnaert in Twenty Years of European Social Dialogue (Directorate-General 
for Employment and Social Affairs, European Commission, 2006) 16 at 17. 
15 See Article 138 of the EC Treaty. 
16 Article 139 of the EC Treaty. 
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should not be neglected since the Treaty provisions represent in substance 
the 1991 agreement which the social partners themselves reached in the 
Val Duchesse talks on the appropriate role for them in the social policy 
field, an agreement which was written into the text of the Social Policy 
Agreement at Maastricht, from whence it found its way into the text of the 
European Community Treaty at Amsterdam).  
Social dialogue exists both in bipartite form (the most familiar version, 
involving a dialogue only between the social partners, which is what is 
involved under Article 38 of the EC Treaty) and tripartite form (which 
involves dialogue not only between the social partners but with public 
authorities as well, and which is exemplified by the Tripartite Social 
Summit, which has existed since 2003).17  
Insofar as legislative output of the social dialogue is concerned (or rather 
the output of the social dialogue process under Article 138 of the EC 
Treaty, frequently implemented by way of legislation under Article 139, 
Bercusson has aptly described this as ‘bargaining in the shadow of the 
law’, since the parties have to assess whether the result of their bargaining 
will be more advantageous to them than the unknown content of any 
alternative EC action.18 
 
                                                 
17 This consists of the Presidency of the Council plus the two subsequent Presidencies, 
the Commission and the social partners, represented at the highest level. (See Council 
Decision 2003/174/EC of 6 March 2003 establishing a Tripartite Social Summit for 
Growth and Employment  (OJ  L 070 31 (14.03.2003)). See in this regard European 
Commission, Recent Developments in the European Inter-Professional Social Dialogue 
2002-3 (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2004) at 12-14). 
18 See generally Chapter 35 of B. Bercusson, European Labour Law (Butterworths, 
London, 1996). 
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A. THE QUESTION OF OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 
European social dialogue has been described by the Commission as “a 
unique and indispensable component of the European social model”.19 It 
was a process born of the need to make progress in the social field, since 
serious difficulties were being encountered, at the time of its coming 
about, in using the traditional method of Community legislation in getting 
measures of a social nature through the Council of Ministers.20  It has been 
referred to (not inaccurately) as “a tool for federalisation in all aspects of 
economic and social questions”.21 Parallels can clearly be drawn with the 
origins of the Open Method of Coordination, which was also born of 
failure experienced in using certain other methods of cooperation at 
European level. In terms of its ‘output legitimacy’, there can be no doubt 
that the social dialogue has enjoyed successes. In terms of legislation, in 
the close to fourteen years of its existence, cross-industry directives such 
as the parental leave, part-time work and fixed-term contracts legislation 
have been adopted, as well as sectoral directives concerning working time 
both in sea transport and in civil aviation.22 Thus ‘the shadow of the law’ 
has in the past (at least on these occasions) seemed to give the social 
                                                 
19 See the Commission website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/index_en.htm (18 January, 2007). 
20 See contribution of J. Delors in European Commission, Twenty Years of European 
Social Dialogue (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2006) at 12). 
21 O. Quintin (Director-General for Employment and Social Affairs) in her foreword to 
The Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social 
Affairs, European Commission, 2003) 
22 Viz., Council Directive 1999/63/EC of 21 June 1999 concerning the Agreement on the 
organisation of working time of seafarers concluded by the European Community 
Shipowners' Association (ECSA) and the Federation of Transport Workers' Unions in the 
European Union (FST) (OJ L 167 33 (2.7.1999)) and Council Directive 2000/79/EC of 
27 November 2000 concerning the European Agreement on the Organisation of Working 
Time of Mobile Workers in Civil Aviation concluded by the Association of European 
Airlines (AEA), the European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF), the European 
Cockpit Association (ECA), the European Regions Airline Association (ERA) and the 
International Air Carrier Association (IACA)  (OJ L 302 57 (1.12.2000)).  
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partners sufficient incentive to negotiate. And yet a policy-making process 
such as the social dialogue, which is grounded on consensus between the 
social partners is clearly subject to major limits as a policy-making tool, 
Not all policies can be adopted by consensus, and all social policies 
adopted through this process are by definition subject to the veto of trade 
unions, and, more significantly in the employment field, employers. 
Moreover, there are definite limits to which the threat posed by the 
‘shadow of the law’ can impel employers towards the negotiating table in 
the social dialogue process, since (as with the draft Temporary Workers 
Directive) it may be clear that insufficient consensus is unlikely to exist at 
Council level for the adoption of a legislative measure in the area outside 
the process of social dialogue. The social dialogue has known significant 
failures in legislative terms. Thus for example, the social partners, 
although consulted, declined to enter into negotiations on establishing 
either European Works Councils or a general framework for informing 
and consulting employees in the European Community, leaving the 
Community legislative organs to negotiate and adopt both Directive 
94/45/EC and Directive 2002/14/EC without them.23 Further, despite 
engaging in extended negotiations on the Temporary Workers Directive, 
they failed to reach any agreement. This failure has to date been more 
significant than those concerning the European Works Council Directive 
and the Framework Information and Consultation Directive, as the 
Temporary Workers Directive has as yet failed to be adopted by the 
Council using the normal legislative procedure).24 It may be an 
exaggeration to describe the social dialogue as ‘marking time’ or as being 
                                                 
23 Directive 2002/14 /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the 
European Community (OJ L 80/29 (23.3.2002))and Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 
September 1994 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in 
Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the 
purposes of informing and consulting employees (OJ L 254/64 (30.9.1994)). 
24 See now amended proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the Council 
on working conditions for temporary workers (COM/2002/0701 final)(Brussels, 28 
November, 2002). 
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‘bogged down’ 25 but there certainly seems to have been a significant step 
away from the creation of hard law in its activities in recent years. Thus in 
the Work Programme of the European Social Partners 2006-2008, the 
social partners cite as notable achievements in the previous three years the 
negotiation of “two framework agreements on telework and work-related 
stress, two frameworks of actions on lifelong learning and gender equality 
and [the development of] a programme to assist social partners of the new 
Member States joining in the EU social dialogue. The perception of a 
necessity to develop the Open Method of Coordination in the social field 
could be regarded as an implicit admission that existing policy-making 
tools in the social field—including the social dialogue have been 
inadequate to achieve the Community’s goals. In recent years much focus 
has been put on the sectoral aspect of the social dialogue and it is to this 
topic it is now proposed to turn briefly. 
 
B. THE SECTORAL ASPECT OF THE SOCIAL DIALOGUE 
Less obvious than the cross-industry or inter-professional side of the social 
dialogue (which has, after all, led to the most significant items of social-
dialogue driven legislation, the parental leave, part-time work and fixed-
term contracts directives) but by now responsible for much of any 
dynamism which the social dialogue process manifests is its sectoral 
aspect. The sectoral side of the social dialogue has seen very considerable 
development since the Commission established the sectoral social 
dialogue committees in 1998.26 By 2005, no less than 31 sectoral dialogue 
committees were in place. A 2003 Commission document counted the 
sectoral dialogue as having already given rise to 230 commitments of 
different types and scale. Although this seems to be the last time such a 
count was carried out, the number of such commitments has certainly risen 
                                                 
25 Criticisms referred to in the contribution of W. Beirnaert in European Commission, 
Twenty Years of European Social Dialogue (Directorate-General for Employment and 
Social Affairs, 2006) 16 at 18. 
26 See in this regard Commission Communication COM (98) 322 final 
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very considerably since then.27 A flavour of the varying natures of the 
agreements reached by the social partners is given in the text below.28 
 
C. THE INTERACTION OF SOCIAL DIALOGUE WITH OTHER 
POLICY-MAKING TOOLS (SUCH AS LEGISLATION AND THE OPEN 
METHOD OF COORDINATION) IN THE SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING 
FIELD  
A feature of social dialogue as a policy-making process has been the level 
of interaction which its deployment has involved with other policy-making 
processes, such as legislation or the Open Method of Coordination. The 
most obvious example of its interaction with legislation is of course 
provided by the use by the Commission and Council of Article 139 of the 
EC Treaty to implement both cross-industry and sectoral agreements in the 
form of directives—viz., the (cross-industry) parental leave, part-time 
work and fixed-term contracts directives and the (sectoral) directives 
concerning working time both in sea transport and in civil aviation.29 
                                                 
27 See for evidence of this the European Commission report, Recent Developments in the 
European Sectoral Social Dialogue (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs 
and Equal Opportunities, 2005). Note also that the number of sectoral committees has 
increased since 2003. The Commission web page (accessed in January 2006) asserted the 
adoption of over 300 joint texts, although if the earlier figure given was correct, this 
seems likely to be an underestimate. 
28 See the text below under the heading, The Flexibility of Outcome Provided by the 
Social Dialogue 
29 Viz., Council Directive 1999/63/EC of 21 June 1999 concerning the Agreement on the 
organisation of working time of seafarers concluded by the European Community 
Shipowners' Association (ECSA) and the Federation of Transport Workers' Unions in the 
European Union (FST) (OJ L 167 33 (2.7.1999)) and Council Directive 2000/79/EC of 
27 November 2000 concerning the European Agreement on the Organisation of Working 
Time of Mobile Workers in Civil Aviation concluded by the Association of European 
Airlines (AEA), the European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF), the European 
Cockpit Association (ECA), the European Regions Airline Association (ERA) and the 
International Air Carrier Association (IACA)  (OJ L 302 57 (1.12.2000)).  
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However, cross-fertilisation with the legislative process also takes place in 
ways other than the social partners simply seeking to influence the 
Community legislature by having agreements reached by them 
implemented in the form of legislation. Calls for legislative or foreign 
policy action, support for existing legislative initiatives and consultation 
on the content of legislation or the overall direction of Community social 
policy can also play a role. Thus for example, the sectoral social dialogue 
process has produced, variously an agreed declaration calling for 
Community measures ensuring high standards in the private security 
sector,30 a joint opinion in support of a Community legislative initiative in 
the road transport area,31 the adoption of a clause for inclusion in the 
protocols to fisheries agreements between the European Union and third 
countries,32 a number of joint declarations by the social partners in the 
construction industry for the Posted Workers Directive,33 the offering of 
an (apparently influential) opinion on the draft Community ‘Everything 
but Arms’ regulation by the social partners in the sugar industry 34 and a 
common position by the social partners in the footwear industry on the 
European social agenda.35 Social dialogue has also provided a means to 
facilitate the increase of the policy-determining weight of the social 
                                                 
30 Agreement of 13 December, 2001 between European Confederation of Security 
Services and UNI-Europa. 
31 Joint opinion of 2002 by the International Road Transport Union and the European 
Transport Workers’  Federation. 
32 Adopted in 2001 by the Association of National Organisations of Fishing Enterprises 
in the EU, the General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation in the EU (Europêche-
Cogeca) and the European Transport Workers’ Federation. 
33 European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe (Directorate-General 
for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 25. 
34 Council Regulation (EC) No 2820/98 of 21 December 1998 applying a multiannual 
scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 1 July 1999 to 31 December 2001 
(OJ L 134 1-109 (29.5.2003)). See European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue 
in Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 40. 
35 Ibid., at 27. 
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partners and/or to mobilise politically. Hence, for example, in 2001, the 
relevant partners in the tourism, hotels, restaurants and cafés sector signed 
a joint declaration on the effects of VAT on activities and employment in 
this sector and presented joint declarations in favour of a reduced rate of 
VAT as well as a common position on the Commission communication on 
tourism.36 In the railways sector, the social partners concluded a 
memorandum of understanding with the European Association for 
Railway Interoperability in order to ensure the involvement of the partners 
in the drawing up of technical specifications for interoperability.37 
The social dialogue has also been used in conjunction with the Open 
Method of Coordination in order to achieve policy goals. The first 
apparent example of this seems to have been the framework of actions for 
the lifelong development of competencies and qualifications which was 
presented by the social partners to the Barcelona European Council in 
March 2002 (as a contribution to the achievement of the Lisbon strategy) 
and which identified a number of priorities in the field of lifelong learning. 
The signatory social parties agreed to implement the framework through 
an Open Method of Coordination—“in other words by establishing goals 
or guidelines at European level using the open method of coordination, 
which are followed up by regular national reports and systematic 
assessment of progress achieved in their implementation.” By 2005, no 
less three follow-up reports had been published by the social partners, 
although the degree of success constituted by this has to be judged in the 
light of the reality the results achieved by this process seem to have varied 
very considerably from one member state to another.38 
 
                                                 
36 COM (2001) 665 final (13 November, 2001). 
37 See European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe (Directorate-
General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 36. 
38 For the third of these reports, see http://www.etuc.org/a/901 
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D. THE FLEXIBILITY OF OUTCOME PROVIDED BY THE SOCIAL 
DIALOGUE 
An extraordinary range of agreed outcomes, both legislative and 
otherwise, has been given rise to by the process of social dialogue. The 
flexibility of outcomes which may be given rise to by the social dialogue 
process constitutes a factor which this process has in common with the 
Open Method of Coordination. In some respects, the variety of outcomes 
reflects the variety of circumstances driving such agreements. Thus 
agreements reached by the social partners may be own-initiative 
undertakings, or they may stem from the process of consultation by the 
Commission under Article 138.39 
In terms of legislation, as has already been noted, cross-industry directives 
such as the parental leave, part-time work and fixed-term contracts 
legislation have been the outcome of the inter-professional social dialogue, 
while the sectoral social dialogue has given rise to directives concerning 
working time both in sea transport and in civil aviation.40 
In terms of agreements, the content tends to range from mere general 
recommendations to commitments to precise action, accompanied by 
monitoring systems. Included in the gamut of measures which have been 
agreed under the sectoral social dialogue are (by way of example) 
                                                 
39 According to the Commission, they may also stem from the application of Community 
decisions or directives. See European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in 
Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 8. 
40 Viz., Council Directive 1999/63/EC of 21 June 1999 concerning the Agreement on the 
organisation of working time of seafarers concluded by the European Community 
Shipowners' Association (ECSA) and the Federation of Transport Workers' Unions in the 
European Union (FST) (OJ L 167 33 (2.7.1999)) and Council Directive 2000/79/EC of 
27 November 2000 concerning the European Agreement on the Organisation of Working 
Time of Mobile Workers in Civil Aviation concluded by the Association of European 
Airlines (AEA), the European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF), the European 
Cockpit Association (ECA), the European Regions Airline Association (ERA) and the 
International Air Carrier Association (IACA)  (OJ L 302 57 (1.12.2000)).  
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recommended standards of conduct in the hairdressing industry,41 as well 
as the circulation of a teaching CD-ROM aimed at tutors and pupils for the 
purposes of testing the skills of apprentice hairdressers,42 an agreed 
declaration calling for Community measures ensuring high standards in 
the private security sector,43 a joint opinion in support of a legislative 
initiative in the road transport area,44 voluntary guidelines concerning age 
diversity and work in the commercial field,45 agreed guidelines for 
teleworking,46 a report on the concept of employability in the railways 
sector,47 the publication of a health and safety good practice guide for 
small- and medium-sized undertakings in the construction sector, 48 
common positions concerning the ratification of International Labour 
                                                 
41 Agreement reached in 2001 between the International Hairdressing Confederation and 
the International Hairdressing Union. 
42 The social partners in the sugar sector (viz., the European Committee of Sugar 
Manufacturers and the European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade 
Unions) similarly produced a training CD-ROM—the Leonardo kit—which was intended 
to help prevent industrial accidents. (See European Commission, The Sectoral Social 
Dialogue in Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 
40). 
43 Agreement of 13 December, 2001 between European Confederation of Security 
Services and UNI-Europa. 
44 Joint opinion of 2002 by the International Road Transport Union and the European 
Transport Workers’  Federation. 
45 Agreement of 11 March 2002 between Eurocommerce and Uni-Europa. 
46 Agreement of February 2001 between UNI-Europa and the European 
Telecommunications Network Operators' Association. 
47 Report published in November 2001 by a working party from the sectoral social 
dialogue committee for the railways sector (on the basis of a survey carried out amoung a 
number of European railway companies). 
48 Drawn up in December 2002 by the FIEC and the EFBWW_. 
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Organisation conventions in the sea transport field, 49 the adoption of a 
clause for inclusion in the protocols to fisheries agreements between the 
European Union and third countries,50 and the offering of an opinion on 
the Community ‘Everything but Arms’ regulation.51 
This is to offer but a very small sample—although an illustrative one—of 
the variety of agreed outcomes which have emerged from the social 
dialogue process.  
There is also at least one sense in which the outcome capable of being 
produced by social dialogue is variable in a negative sense, however. The 
Commission’s own estimate is that the rate of coverage by agreements 
which are not translated into legislation is “approximately 80%” of 
workers and undertakings, a figure which is partly owed to the 
incorporation of agreements into business agreements and the use of 
extension procedures or mechanisms in a significant number of countries. 
Even accepting this figure, this is significantly smaller than the percentage 
of workers and undertakings capable (if at times only in a technical sense) 
of being reached by legislation. In addition, the proportion of workers and 
undertakings covered varies wildly from one member state to another—
from 95% in Austria and Finland to a mere 30% in the United Kingdom.52 
                                                 
49 Agreed between the European Community Shipowners’ Association and the European 
Transport Workers’ Federation. See European Commission, The Sectoral Social 
Dialogue in Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 
39. 
50 Adopted in 2001 by the Association of National Organisations of Fishing Enterprises 
in the EU, the General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation in the EU (Europêche-
Cogeca) and the European Transport Workers’ Federation. 
51 Council Regulation (EC) No 2820/98 of 21 December 1998 applying a multiannual 
scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 1 July 1999 to 31 December 2001 
(OJ L 134 1-109 (29.5.2003)). 
52 Figures quoted from European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe 
(Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 6 (in which reliance 
was made on the report Industrial Relations in Europe 2002). 
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The effectiveness of the social dialogue as a policy-making tool in the 
absence of implementing legislation under Article 139 must clearly be 
judged in the light of such figures. 
 
E. THE SOCIAL DIALOGUE AS AN EVOLVING PROCESS 
A feature of the social dialogue process has been its evolving nature. 
Again, this is something which this process has in common with the Open 
Method of Coordination. The Commission Communications of 1998 
(entitled Adapting and promoting the social dialogue at Community level) 
and 2002 (entitled The European social dialogue, a force for innovation 
and change) were conscious attempts to push this process of development 
onwards. Thus the former document set out the basis of the establishment, 
composition and functioning of sectoral social dialogue committees. The 
latter document aimed at improving existing structures and promoting 
more effective dialogue, including by reinforcing the role of the ‘liaison 
forum’, which is a bipartite arena for informing and consulting both 
sectoral and cross-industry social partner organisations at European level, 
which meets several times a year at the invitation of the Commission.53 
Numerous significant recent steps in the process of evolution can be 
pointed out—the establishment, for example, of the ‘liaison forum’ and 
the establishment of multi-annual work programmes beginning in the 
period 2003-2005. Were one to look more broadly at the history of the 
social dialogue, then two, perhaps three distinct periods of evolution could 
be identified. The first would consist of the period from 1985 to 1993, 
which marked the beginning of cross-industry social dialogue. The second 
would be seen as having begun with the coming into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the associated Social Policy Agreement, at which 
time the possibility of legislative implementation of agreements between 
the social partners came about. According to the Commission, a third 
period of evolution, characterised by growth in independence and 
autonomy of the social partners can be seen to have begun at the Laeken 
                                                 
53 Ibid., at 11. The role of the liaison forum was set out in the Commission’s 2002 
Communication, The Social Dialogue, a force for innovation and change (COM(2002) 
341 final). 
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European Council in 2001 (where the social partners presented a joint 
contribution) and  characterised by multi-annual work programmes and 
less focus on implementation of agreements through legislation.54 
 
F. A MAJOR ROLE FOR THE COMMISSION 
The major role of the Commission is very much reflected in the relevant 
Treaty provisions concerning the social dialogue. Thus under Article 138 
of the EC Treaty, the Commission is given the task of promoting the 
consultation of management and labour at Community level and of taking 
any relevant measure to facilitate their dialogue by ensuring balanced 
support for the parties.55 It is the Commission which is to consult 
management and labour on the possible direction of Community action, 
before submitting proposals in the social policy field, 56 and the 
Commission which must consult management and labour on the content of 
the envisaged proposal, should it consider Community action advisable, 
after such initial consultation (and of course to the Commission that 
management and labour are required to forward the relevant opinion or, 
where appropriate, a recommendation).57 Should the social partners wish 
to take control of the process, it is the Commission they inform of their 
wish to initiate the Article 139 procedure. The Commission then has a 
power of co-decision (with the social partners on whether to extend the 
usual nine month limit to the duration of Article 139 dialogue.58 
                                                 
54 See e.g, See European Commission, Recent Developments in the European Inter-
Professional Social Dialogue 2002-3 (Directorate-General for Employment and Social 
Affairs, 2004) at 6. 
55 Article 138(1) of the EC Treaty. 
56 Article 138(2) of the EC Treaty. 
57 Article 138(3) of the EC Treaty. 
58 Article 138(4) of the EC Treaty. 
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Agreements reached by the social partners under Article 139 can only be 
implemented via Council decision if this is “on a proposal from the 
Commission”.59 
Of course, the use of social dialogue extends beyond its use to create 
agreements envisaged in Article 139. Whatever the use to which it is put, 
however, the Commission, has had in the past—and seems to retain —
considerable importance in the development of the dialogue—a point 
which this policy-making tool has in common with the Open Method of 
Coordination.60 Thus, for example, it has been acknowledged from the 
side of management that the Maastricht Social Policy Agreement—very 
much the birth certificate of the social dialogue process—“would never 
have seen the light of day” “if it had not been for the creativity and 
obstinacy of Jacques Delors”.61 (Sight should not be lost of the fact that 
the Val Duchesse process which preceded it from 1985 onwards was also 
Commission-driven). On a more ongoing basis, the experience of ETUC 
has been that “the social dialogue has done better whenever the European 
Commission has maintained a high profile and a strong initiative in the 
social sphere.” 62 The evolutionary process which the social dialogue has 
undergone (and which has been referred to in the text above) has been 
very much supported and assisted by the Commission 63—and the 
                                                 
59 Article 139(2) of the EC Treaty. 
60 Note the precedent for the role of the Commission provided by Monnet’s creation, the 
Commissariat du Plan, on which, interestingly, both Jacques Delors and Jacques Fournier 
(then President of CEEP) had worked in 1960s France.  (See contribution of J. Fournier 
in European Commission, Twenty Years of European Social Dialogue (Directorate-
General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2006) at 19). 
61 See contribution of W. Beirnaert in European Commission, Twenty Years of European 
Social Dialogue (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2006) at 16. 
62 See contribution of E. Gabaglio (former General Secretary of ETUC) in European 
Commission, Twenty Years of European Social Dialogue (Directorate-General for 
Employment and Social Affairs, 2006) at 15. 
63 As is testified to by the publication of the Commission of its 2002 and 2004 
Communications, The Social Dialogue, a force for innovation and change (COM(2002) 
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Commission’s role continues to be significant in new forms which social 
dialogue takes.64 (Hence, for example, it is the Commission which takes 
the initiative concerning the meetings of the social partners’ liaison 
forum). And not to be forgotten is the crucial financial support provided 
for the process of social dialogue by the Commission. Thus for example 
by 2003 the sectoral social dialogue was being provided with significant 
financial support by the Commission (totalling over 28 million euro) 
distributed under three separate budget lines.65 
 
G. THE QUESTION OF INPUT LEGITIMACY—WHO GETS TO 
NEGOTIATE AND HOW REPRESENTATIVE ARE THEY? 
If a question mark is to be put over the social dialogue process, perhaps 
the obvious place in which to put it concerns its ‘input legitimacy’. Thus, 
for example, under Article 139, nobody but ‘management and labour’ is 
given the right to negotiate agreements. Who the representatives of 
management and labour are is left—subject to not-over rigorous judicial 
control 66—to the Commission. In fairness, the Commission appears to 
                                                                                                                         
341 final) and Partnership for change in an enlarged Europe—Enhancing the role of 
European Social Dialogue (COM(2004) 557 final). 
64 Note for example the Commission role in the sectoral social dialogue committees in 
preparing meetings, agendas and in following up work previously validated at plenary 
meetings. (See European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe 
(Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 11). 
65 Budget line B3-4000 (established to promote development of social dialogue at cross-
industry and sectoral levels), B3-4002 (which was intended to fund training and 
information measures for worker organisations) and B3-4003 (which was aimed in 
particular at funding measures to strengthen transnational cooperation by workers’ and 
employer’s representatives with regard to information and consultation in undertakings 
operating in a number of member states). See generally European Commission, The 
Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social 
Affairs, 2003) at 12. 
66 See Case T-135/96 Union Européenne de l’Artisanat et des Petites et Moyennes 
Entreprises (UEAPME) v. Council of the European Union [1998] ECR II-2335 in which 
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display very considerable sensitivity to the point that representativeness 
and input legitimacy more generally is key to (if not the Achille’s heel of) 
the social dialogue in terms of its legitimacy. Such sensitivity manifests 
itself in the acknowledgment by the Commission that “representativeness 
is obviously essential for the legitimacy of the social dialogue” 67 and in 
the fact that whenever an application to set up a committee is made, the 
Commission sends the social partner organisations involved a 
questionnaire enabling them to evaluate, inter alia, the level of their own 
representativeness.68 It manifests itself in the fact that the Commission 
commissions continuing research in order to enable it to monitor the 
representativeness of European social partner organisations.69 Further, it is 
to be seen in the fact that the Commission has also established objective 
criteria which must be met in order for social partner organisations to be 
considered eligible for consultation viz., that the organisations must (i) be 
cross-industry, or relate to specific sectors or categories and be organised 
at European level; (ii) consist of organisations which are themselves an 
integral and recognised part of Member States' social partner structures 
and with the capacity to negotiate agreements, and which are 
representative of all Member States, as far as possible;  and (iii) have 
adequate structures to ensure the effective participation in the consultation 
                                                                                                                         
the Court of First Instance stipulated that it was essential that the signatories of an 
agreement, taken together, were sufficiently representative  to justify the Council 
converting the agreement into a Directive. The ruling is analysed in E. Franssen and A. 
Jacobs, “The Question of Representativity in the European Social Dialogue” (1998) 35 
CMLRev 1295. 
67 See e.g., the European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe 
(Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 11 
68 Ibid. 
69 See European Commission, Recent Developments in the European Inter-Professional 
Social Dialogue 2002-3 (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2004) 
at 15 and European Commission, Recent Developments in the European Sectoral Social 
Dialogue (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 
2005) at 5. The relevant research is carried out by the Institute of Labour Sciences at the 
Catholic University of Louvain and much of it is available at 
http://www.uclouvain.be/en-11476.html  
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process.70 Overall, approximately fifty such organisations are said to meet 
these criteria,71 but at cross-industry level, the number of players is much 
smaller: workers are represented at European by the European Trade 
Union Confederation (ETUC), which represents 77 member organisations 
in 35 European countries,72 and has a total of 60 million members.73 
European employers are represented by the Union of Industrial and 
Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE), which represents the 
employers' organisations of 27 European countries,74 and by the European 
Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of 
General Economic Interest (CEEP). In practice, the number of parties 
which have been involved in negotiating European-level agreements 
seems to have been kept smaller than the number who have been consulted 
about initiatives in the social policy field.75  
                                                 
70 The three criteria of representativeness were defined by the Commission in its 
communication of 1993 (COM (93) 600 final), and taken up again in further 
communiciations in 1996 (COM (96) 448 final) and 1998 (COM (98) 322 final). (See 
Commission social dialogue website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/represent_en.htm). 
71 Ibid. See for a list of these the annex to the 2002 Commission Communication COM 
(2002) 341 final. 
72 In addition to eleven European associations of trade unions. 
73 Other trade union bodies operate under the auspices of ETUC, which additionally 
liaises with certain other European trade union bodies. 
74 The small-  and medium-sized enterprises body UEAPME (Union européenne de 
l'artisanat et des petites et moyennes entreprises) participates in the European social 
dialogue as part of the UNICE delegation. 
75 According to Betten, in practice, the number of partners who are regarded as capable of 
concluding agreements is more limited than the number regarded as qualifying for 
consultation. (See L. Betten, “The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in 
Community Social Policy” (1998) 23 European Law Review 20 at 30-31. Interestingly, 
the Commission website describes the circa. fifty organisations having the legitimacy to 
be consulted in conformity with article 138 of the Treaty as only  “possibly” having the 
legitimacy to enter negotiations (see 
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Concern about the representativeness of those of the social partners which 
have actually negotiated agreements has led to (unsuccessful) litigation in 
the past.76 The Commission has stressed the embeddedness of both 
employer and employees representatives in industry in addition to their 
mandate from their affiliated organisations as providing them with the 
authority to speak on behalf of employers or the workforce as the case 
may be.77 But concern has been expressed by some commentators that 
although UNICE, CEEP and ETUC are the most representative 
organisations of their kind, they still can not claim to represent a majority 
of employers and workers.78 There is also the broader issue of the non-
representation of parties, other than management and (employed) labour 
who are affected by social legislation. Thus, for example, legislation 
which creates higher employment for workers may be argued to have 
                                                                                                                         
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/represent_en.htm) and has 
acknowledged that the requirement of representativeness will be stricter in the case of a 
negotiated agreement than for a simple consultation. (See European Commission, The 
Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social 
Affairs, 2003) at 11). 
76 See Case T-135/96 Union Européenne de l’Artisanat et des Petites et Moyennes 
Entreprises (UEAPME) v. Council of the European Union [1998] ECR II-2335. Compare 
the similarly unsuccessful earlier litigation (concerning appointments to the Consultative 
Committee of the ECSC) Case 66-76 Confédération française démocratique du travail 
(CFDT) v Council of the European Communities [1977] ECR 305. 
77 See European Commission, Recent Developments in the European Sectoral Social 
Dialogue (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 
2005) at 6. 
78 See L. Betten, “The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community 
Social Policy” (1998) 23 European Law Review 20 at 32. On the question of 
representativeness, note also  
E. Franssen and A. Jacobs, “The Question of Representativity in the European Social 
Dialogue” (1998) 35 CMLRev 1295. 
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economic implications for the unemployed. And issues of parental rights 
affect even ‘non-working’ parents. 
It is only fair to note that (as already mentioned in the text above) social 
dialogue exists both in bipartite form (involving a dialogue only between 
the social partners, which is what is involved under Article 38 of the EC 
Treaty) and tripartite form (which involves dialogue not only between the 
social partners but with public authorities as well).  In the latter case, 
problems of representativeness are less, since the interests of parties not 
represented by the social partners may be capable of being represented by 
the public authorities involved.  In this regard, it is of interest that so-
called tripartite concertation has been taking place since 2003 on both the 
political and the technical level in relation to macroeconomics, 
employment, social protection and education and training since the setting 
up of the Tripartite Social Summit, which, as noted above, consists of the 
Presidency of the Council (plus the two subsequent Presidencies, the 
Commission and the social partners, represented at the highest level).79  
 
H. THE WEAK ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN THE 
SOCIAL DIALOGUE PROCESS 
Arguably inextricably linked to the question of the legitimacy of the social 
dialogue process is the minor role accorded to the European Parliament in 
this process. It is not true to say that the European Parliament is entirely 
excluded from any role in practice, since it would appear that it is 
informed about proposals at least when they are at an early stage,80 and 
                                                 
79 See Council Decision 2003/174/EC of 6 March 2003 establishing a Tripartite Social 
Summit for Growth and Employment  (OJ  L 070 31 (14.03.2003)). See in this regard 
European Commission, Recent Developments in the European Inter-Professional Social 
Dialogue 2002-3 (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2004) at 12-
14. 
80 L. Betten, loc. cit., n. 79 above, at 32, citing the 1993 Commission Communication 
COM (93) 600. In addition, should the social dialogue process be entirely successful, 




26                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 03 NO. 05 
also that it is in practice asked its opinion on any social partners’ 
agreement which it is proposed to implement by way of legislation.81 But 
these are matters of practice rather than legal entitlement. Officially, “the 
only institution which represents and is chosen by all the peoples of the 
EU, is excluded from the legislative process of [Article 139(2)]”.82 The 
process largely bypasses the European Parliament.  
Unsurprisingly, the European Parliament itself has long asked for a power 
of codecision so that, like the Council, it too could reject or approve any 
proposal in the social dialogue field.83 Given that this corresponds to the 
usual conception of democracy at European level, it seems somewhat 
anomalous that it is an approach which has not yet been acceded to. Until 
it is, legitimacy in the parliamentary sense might perhaps be sought in the 
control by national parliaments of their executives in the Council of 
Ministers is not addressed in this article. But in reality, very considerable 
difficulties exist with the exercise of such control in most, if not all, 
member states. 84 Further, such control will be by definition absent in the 
case of an outvoted member state, wherever a qualified majority vote is 
taken to implement an agreement of the social partners by Community 
legislation (a possibility which exists under Article 139(2) of the EC 
Treaty).  Interestingly, the process of social dialogue has been described 
from within the Commission as “the product of a long democratic tradition 
shared by all Member States of the European Union” 85 and the assertion 
                                                 
81 See E. Franssen and A. Jacobs, “The Question of Representativity in the European 
Social Dialogue” (1998) 35 CMLRev 1295 at 1305. 
82 Ibid. 
83 See resolution EP T4-0413/1997 of 18 July 1997 (OJ C286 325-338 (22.09.1997))  
84 See in relation to this topic G. Barrett (ed.),  National Parliaments and the European 
Union: The Constitutional Challenge for the Oireachtas and Other Member State 
Legislatures (Clarus Press, Dublin, 2007, forthcoming) 
85 See O. Quintin, Foreword to European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in 
Europe (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 3 
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made that “in an innovative way, the social dialogue forms part of the 
democratic governance of Europe”.86 A rights-based vocabulary has also 
been used, whereby the social dialogue is described as “a component of 
fundamental social rights”.87 In some ways, such claims are perhaps not 
implausible, given the impressively increased involvement of the social 
partners brought about by the process of social dialogue in determining the 
rules which are to govern their members. At the same time, it must be 
acknowledged that whatever democratic legitimacy the social dialogue 
process has apparently stems (at least to date) from a non-parliamentary 
concept of democracy.  
 
I. THE LACK OF TRANSPARENCY 
Linked perhaps to the question of representativeness is the question of 
transparency. Supposedly, law should be made in public. Pressure has 
increased in recent years for the Council to be more open when it is 
exercising its law-making role. It may seem curious therefore to have set 
up—relatively recently—a system which can lead to the adoption of, inter 
alia, Community directives, and yet in which transparency is limited, 
except perhaps to those directly involved in policy-making in this way. 
 
                                                 
86 European Commission, The Sectoral Social Dialogue in Europe (Directorate-General 
for Employment and Social Affairs, 2003) at 7. Beirnaert asserts that “the Social 
Dialogue plays a major role in democracy by associating the kinetic forces of the 
economy with the definition of a socio-economic policy”. See W. Beirnaert, European 
Commission, Twenty Years of European Social Dialogue (Directorate-General for 
Employment and Social Affairs, 2006) at 18.  
87 Ibid., at 13. 
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J. THE LACK OF OPENNESS TO OTHER VOICES ONCE AN 
AGREEMENT IS REACHED BY THE SOCIAL PARTNERS 
The flexibility of the social dialogue process in terms of the outcomes 
which it is capable of producing has been adverted to in the text above. 
However, in at least one way the social dialogue process has produced an 
outcome which is remarkably inflexible—viz., there seems to be little 
room for input from any other party or institution once agreement has been 
reached by the social partners. Even the Commission and the Council who 
are given an express role by Article 139 seem unwilling or unable to use 
this role in order to amend in any way agreements reached by the social 
partners. As Franssen and Jacobs note, “it is the social partners who are 
responsible for the detailed contents of the Directive, as the Council seems 
to refrain from amending the text and to restrict itself to adopting or 
rejecting the agreement” 88 This has led to a situation in which “the social 
partners are absolute masters over the contents of an agreement [but] the 
Community institutions still decide whether they want to turn those 
contents into Community law”.89 This may be seen as linked to the 
question of representativeness, discussed above, since it means that only 
the views of the social partners will ever be reflected in a European-level 
agreement that is converted into Community law under the procedure 
provided by Article 139. 
 
K. THE CHALLENGE OF EASTERN ENLARGEMENT 
Starting with the EFTA enlargement in 1995, countries acceding to the 
European Community have had not only had to receive the legislative 
acquis communautaire into their systems, but have also had to incorporate 
what may be called the social dialogue acquis at both sectoral and inter-
sectoral level. The May 2004 (and now January 2007) enlargements of the 
European Community have presented major challenges to the use of the 
                                                 
88 Loc. cit., n. 82 above, at 1306. 
89 Betten, loc. cit., n. 79 above, at 33. 
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social dialogue in the social policy area, inter alia,  because of the lack of 
the necessary infrastructure (in the form of properly functioning 
independent trade union and employer organisations) in many of the 
former Eastern bloc countries to take part in the social dialogue process. 
Thus the Commission has referred to  
the inherent weakness of structures for bilateral dialogue in 
most of the acceding countries, in addition to a number of other 
problems including low and frequently declining rates of 
unionisation, poor levels of recruitment amongst employers’ 
organisations, fragmentation of the employers’ and trade union 
organisations in some cases, and limited financial resources, all 
against the backdrop of an unfavourable economic climate.90 
Problems such as these obviously seriously hinder participation in the 
European social dialogue process (whether at inter-professional or at 
sectoral level) by social partners from the newly-acceded member states.91 
 
III. DEPLOYING THE CLASSIC ‘COMMUNITY 
METHOD’: REFLECTIONS ON ONE PROMINENT 
EXAMPLE OF LEGISLATION IN THE SOCIAL POLICY 
FIELD—THE ACQUIRED RIGHTS DIRECTIVE 
At the core of Community social policy for much of its existence has been 
(and in many areas remains) the Community method of legislation. Much 
of Community social policy is effected via the adoption of legislation, 
                                                 
90 European Commission, Recent Developments in the European Inter-Professional 
Social Dialogue 2002-3 (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 2004) 
at 24. 
91 Indeed, they cause difficulties even beyond this sphere, since a whole range of 
Community directives dealing with everything from health and safety to information and 
consultation now require the involvement of social partners. 
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normally in the form of a  directive (defined as an instrument which “shall 
be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to 
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice 
of form and methods”) or, less usually a regulation, (which “shall have 
general application” and “shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States.”) 92 
A comprehensive comparative analysis of the usefulness of using 
Community legislation for the purposes of attaining objectives in the 
social field is a task beyond the aims of this brief paper. It is proposed 
nonetheless to offer some observations concerning one significant 
example of the Community method of legislation in the social policy field 
viz., regarding the Acquired Rights Directive, a measure which has given 
rise to a volume of European Court of Justice rulings second in the 
employment field only to that produced by Community equality law and 
to ask what (if any) lessons can be learned from the experience of having 
used this legislation as a policy-making instrument in the social field. This 
is done by examining the operation of the Acquired Rights Directive both 
from a general perspective and from the particular perspective of the 
implementation experience of one particular member state—in this case, 
Ireland—with comments which are founded on the experience of the 
operation of implementing legislation in this particular country forming 
the latter part of the text which follows.93 
 
                                                 
92 Article 249 of the EC Treaty. Note now in particular Paragraphs (a) to (i) of Article 
137(1) of the EC Treaty which lists fields within the area of employment law in which  
directives may establish minimum requirements for gradual implementation. (See in this 
regard Article 137(2)(b) of the EC Treaty. 
93 The reason for this writer’s interest in this legislation in particular stems in part from 
my undertaking a recent study of the operation of the Directive generally, and later 
having been asked to examine the Irish implementation for a recent study for the 
European Commission, The Implementation and Application of EU Labour Law 
Directives in the Enlarged European Union. This study was submitted sub. nom. Report 
on Implementation by Ireland of Directive 2001/23/EC on the Approximation of Laws of 
the Member States Relating to the Safeguarding of Employees’ rights in the Event of 
Transfers of Undertakings, Businesses or Parts of Businesses. 
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A. SOME GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 
ACQUIRED RIGHTS DIRECTIVE 
What lessons, if any, are to be drawn from the manner in which the 
Acquired Rights Directive originated or has evolved in the thirty years of 
its existence in one form or another ? 94  Looking first (insofar as this is 
possible) at the general European level, a number of observations on how 
this legislation has been formed or operated seem apposite, although 
naturally care must be exercised regarding the extent to which such 
remarks may be generalised to legislation in the social policy field 
generally. 
 
B. ADOPTING AND AMENDING ACQUIRED RIGHTS LEGISLATION: 
THE WATERING DOWN OF AMBITIONS, THE REACHING OF 
UNSATISFACTORY COMPROMISES AND THE USE OF LEGISLATION 
AS A PUBLIC RELATIONS EXERCISE 
A striking feature of the adoption of the original Acquired Rights 
Directive 95 and of its subsequent amendment in 1998 96 has been the very 
                                                 
94 For an analysis of most recent case-law of the European Court of Justice in this area, 
see G. Barrett, “Light Acquired on Acquired Rights - A Survey of Recent Developments 
in the Law on Transfers of Undertakings” (2005) 42 CMLR 1053, and for some more 
recent reflections on some other recent case-law in this area, see by the same writer, 
“Celtec: Asking the Court of a Justice for a Date or The Limits of Consensual Behaviour 
in Privatisations” (2005) 30 ELR 600 and “‘Shall I Compare Thee To…?’ On Article 141 
EC and Lawrence” (2006) 35 ILJ 93. 
95 Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of 
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses (OJ L 61, 5.3.1977, p. 26). 
96 By Council Directive 98/50/EC of 29 June 1998 amending Directive 77/187/EEC on 
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of 
employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
businesses (OJ L 201, 17.7.1998, p. 88). Directive 98/50/EC was  subsequently repealed 
by Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of 
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considerable dilution of the original draft legislation as proposed by the 
European Commission when compared to the legislation in its final form 
Such dilution has been  well documented in the case of the original 
Directive by Hepple,97 who noted the very considerable reduction in the 
scope of ambition of the proposal from its original Commission draft in 
1974 to the legislation ultimately adopted in the form of Directive 77/187 
by the Council. (An example was the elimination, by the time the 
Directive was adopted, of its application to certain share transfer 
situations, an alteration which robbed the Directive of a great deal of its 
significance and capacity to protect workers at national level, most 
particularly in the United Kingdom and Ireland, where large numbers of 
business transfers have always been carried out by this method. Similarly 
eliminated was the provision in Article 8 of the original Commission draft 
of Directive 77/187 that, if negotiations between employers and workers’ 
representatives failed to secure agreement between the parties within a 
period of two months, each could refer the matter to an arbitration board 
which “shall give a binding decision as to what measures shall be taken 
for the benefit of the workers”. Although the 1977 Directive was adopted 
under procedures requiring a unanimous vote in Council_, and some of the 
blame for the watering-down of the original proposal may be attributed to 
the requirement of unanimity which applied in relation to the adoption of 
this proposal,98 it is not clear that the entirety of the such responsibility can 
be straightforwardly ascribed to this cause. Thus, for example, the number 
of votes actually called in legislative matters at Council level has 
historically been so low as to make clear that legislation has tended to be 
adopted by consensus at Council level even where the legislative 
procedure under the EC Treaty involves qualified majority voting, and 
                                                                                                                         
the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of 
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses (OJ L 82, 
22.3.2001, p. 16). 
97 B. Hepple, “Workers’ Rights in Mergers and Takeovers: The EEC Proposals” (1976) 5 
ILJ 197 and see also the note by the same writer on the Acquired Rights Directive in 
(1977) 6 ILJ 106. 
98 The ultimate shape of the Framework Equality Directive was also affected by this 
requirement, particularly insofar as concerned discrimination on grounds of religion. 
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even where such a qualified majority exists.99 In addition, other factors 
seem to be at work: the normal give-and-take of negotiation between any 
parties with widely disparate interests would in any case be expected tend 
to lead in the direction of conclusions of more general nature. In 
particular, the very different collective labour law traditions of the 
member states would militate against very strong provisions in the 
collective employment law field. This last factor is one which probably 
accounts for the particular weakness of the information and consultation 
provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive.100 Acute awareness on the 
part of the member states of the binding nature of the outcome of the 
bargaining process may also be a factor. In addition, sight should not be 
lost of the point that on occasion member states may be as interested in 
being seen to act as in actually acting: legislation may be adopted as an 
indication to the public that something is being done about a particular 
issue, even if in reality the content of the measure is severely lacking. This 
is, in effect, the phenomenon of adopting legislation in whole or in part as 
a public relations exercise. The occurrence of this at national level has 
been noted by O’Hegarty 101 and it is not merely cynicism to suggest that 
there is probably an element of this at European level too. As regards the 
Acquired Rights Directive in particular, it may be noted that in 1977, the 
EEC was still under lingering (if somewhat dissipating) pressure to 
demonstrate via the fulfilment of its social action programme that the 
                                                 
99 See in this regard the Commission White Paper on Governance.  
100 It is interesting to note that the individual employment law provisions of the Directive 
rather than the collective employment law ones have given rise to almost all of the 
litigation to have reached the European Court of Justice (with Case C-382/92 
Commission v. United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2435 being the exception which probes, 
rather than proves, this particular rule). In part this may be because rules of the latter kind 
are less likely to be litigated, but  it may also be because collective labour law is a ‘tough 
law’ area in which transnational legal provisions are much less likely to be effective, 
which is certainly the Irish experience of the implementation of the collective law 
provisions of the Directive (as to which, see more below). 
101 See the chapter by L. O’Hegarty in G. Barrett (ed.),  National Parliaments and the 
European Union: The Constitutional Challenge for the Oireachtas and Other Member 
State Legislatures (Clarus Press, Dublin, 2007, forthcoming)  in which this observation is 
made in the context of the European Union (Scrutiny) Act 2002. 
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Community attached as much significance to its social objectives as to its 
market objectives, and the adoption even of a proposal relating to acquired 
rights even in severely weakened form served this end.102 Similarly, 
securing elusive agreement of all the member states in 1998 on the 
amending Directive 98/50 103 was a notable success for the then British 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers at that time in its final days, even it 
is clear that for some states, copperfastening in Community law the test 
formulated in Süzen 104 for the transfer of an undertaking, as Directive 
98/50 did, must in terms of its substance have been an unsatisfactory 
compromise (given that it was for long a key issue preventing agreement 
on the amending directive). And yet it was agreed to, once it was clear no 
other compromise would be accepted, and once the Court of Justice had 
solved a key part of the political dilemma for the member states by 
interpreting Directive 77/187 in such a way as to transform the enterprise 
organisation concept of the undertaking into a politically convenient status 
quo of European law. 
The weakening of Commission employment law proposals in the 
employment law field once they reach the Council of Ministers is now a 
less regularly-seen phenomenon than was formerly the case. At least part 
of the reason for this, however, has been the appearance of an alternative 
law-generating mechanism in the form of Article 139 agreements between 
the social partners under the social dialogue process. The adoption of the 
bulk of legislative measures in the employment law field now involves 
only the adoption of Directives with the (normally unamended) text of 
such an agreement attached—a method of policy-furtherance which thus 
escapes some of the disadvantages linked to adopting legislation following 
                                                 
102 See Council resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning a social action programme (OJ 
No C 13, 12.2.1974, p. 1)._ 
103 Council Directive 98/50/EC of 29 June 1998 amending Directive 77/187/EEC on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of 
employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
businesses (OJ L 201, 17.7.1998, p. 88) 
104 Case C-13/95 Süzen [1997] ECR I-1259. 
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the procedure used to adopt and amend the Acquired Rights Directive and 
which is examined further in the text below.  
Although insofar as concerns the adoption of the Acquired Rights regime, 
the dilution process was a marked one, at least some of the consequences 
of such dilution may not be permanent. Even initially emasculated or 
otherwise unsatisfactory legislation may constitute a start in a more long-
term sequence of events—a foot in the door which, once held ajar even to 
a narrow extent, can later be pushed further open when circumstances are 
more propitious—something which can be said to have already happened 
in the case of the Acquired Rights Directive, since its present (2001) form 
is the result not just of the original 1977 legislation, but of improving 
amendments made in 1998 (and consolidated in the 2001 measure), in 
addition to the strengthening input of the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Justice. Further, a process of reform which is presently in its very 
early stages seems likely to lead to further amendments and improvements 
within some years—although as of yet, it is worthy of note there seems to 
be no intention to apply the Directive to share transfer situations or to 
attach to resolve disputes concerning the information and consultation 
provisions in the manner envisaged in the original 1974 Commission draft 
Directive. 
 
C. THE DIFFICULTY OF CHANGING DIRECTION IN THE EVENT OF 
BASIC CONCEPTUAL FAILURE IN LEGISLATION 
One point which seems arguably to have be demonstrated by the 
experience of the Acquired Rights Directive is the potential relative 
inflexibility of legislation as a policy-making tool where basic conceptual 
failures occur in the design of a legislative instrument (perhaps because of 
the high political costs of securing agreement in the first place in such 
instruments) and the potential near-irreversibility of such errors. An 
example of this is arguably the entreprise organisation test adopted by the 
European Court of Justice in Süzen, 105 in which the Court asserted that 
                                                 
105 Case C-13/95 [1997] ECR I-1259. 
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“the term entity…refers to an organized grouping of persons and assets 
facilitating the exercise of an economic activity which pursues a specific 
objective” 106 and turned its back decisively on an entreprise-activité 
approach, by expressly denying that the mere similarity of activities 
carried out before and after a transfer would suffice to establish that the 
transfer of an undertaking had occurred. The application of the entreprise 
organisation test has given rise to ongoing difficulties. One is the difficulty 
in distinguishing between asset-based undertakings and those based 
essentially on personnel, 107 a distinction which has to be made in order to 
apply the Süzen test (with no transfer of assets being necessary in the case 
of the latter type of undertaking). Another difficulty is that the entreprise 
organisation test also facilitates avoidance of the Directive in industries 
which do require the use of substantial assets (via the non-transfer of those 
assets). Further, the Süzen 108 test as interpreted in Oy Liikenne, 109 seems 
an utterly inadequate one to protect employees who work in industries 
which operate for the most part without assets: the application of the test 
has led one commentator to observe that 
in contracting out of services the impact of the Directive has 
become, if not voluntary, at least highly contingent upon the 
structuring of the commercial deal by which the contracting 
out, contracting in or reassignment of the contract is effected. 
Where assets are an essential part of the business, the 
application of the Directive can be avoided by not transferring 
the assets; where the business is ‘based essentially on 
                                                 
106 Para. 13 of the judgment of the Court.  
107 See e.g., Case C-172/99 Oy Liikenne [2001] ECR I-745 
108 Case C-13/95 [1997] ECR I-1259. 
109 Case C-172/99 [2001] ECR I-745. 
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manpower’, it can be avoided, it seems, by the new employer 
not offering jobs to the former employer’s workforce.110 
Insofar as the entreprise organisation test has been the cause of ongoing 
difficulties, the Court of Justice may be criticised for the adoption of this 
test and the abandonment by it of the entreprise-activité conceptualisation 
of undertakings used by it in Schmidt.111 In reality, however, most of the 
blame for ongoing difficulties is arguably more appropriately laid at the 
door of the Community legislature. In the first place, the inflexibility with 
which the entreprise organisation test is now applied stems from the fact 
that the Süzen ruling was almost immediately codified by the political 
institutions of the Community, which seized upon it almost immediately 
as the key to resurrecting negotiations on proposed amendments to the 
original Directive and securing agreement on them by the end of the 1998 
British presidency of the Council. The Süzen ruling was thus quickly 
incorporated into the text of the Acquired Rights Directive by a Council 
which could now reassure itself that rather than broadening or narrowing 
the scope of the Directive, it was merely codifying extant case-law.112 The 
possibility of the Court ever reversing its approach was thus taken out of 
its own hands. A second, more basic, argument can be made here, 
however, to the effect that all difficulties relating to the concept of the 
transfer of an undertaking are the result of an even more fundamental 
conceptual error made by the Community legislature in the first place in 
basing a directive aimed at the protection of employees on the notion of 
the transfer of an undertaking rather than on the transfer of a workplace. 
Arguably, it was this mistake as much as the adoption of the Süzen 
entreprise organisation test which has caused all of the subsequent 
problems in this regard. Ironically, exactly the same failure was made in 
                                                 
110 P. Davies, “The UK Will Have to Make Up Its Own Mind” (2001) 30 ILJ 231 at p. 
234.  
111 Case C-392/92 [1994] ECR I-1311. 
112 See now Article 1(1)(b) of Council Directive 2001/23/EC, which repeats the wording 
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United Kingdom and Irish law concerning the transfer of continuity for the 
purposes of the respective national redundancy payments schemes, in 
relation to which the Courts quickly ran into definitional difficulties 
regarding the question of when a business should be regarded as having 
transferred for the purposes of that legislation113—when arguably the 
question of what constituted a business should never have been an issue in 
the first place.  
Another example of a design-flaw which has led to difficulties (in the 
form of a restriction on the scope of the Directive on grounds which seem 
difficult to defend in policy terms) is the large-scale exclusion of public 
sector workers from the benefit of the Directive, due to the failure to adopt 
a European-wide definition of employee in the manner of Community 
equality law 114 or Community law on the free movement of workers. 115 It 
may be that sufficient room for judicial manoeuvre has been left to the 
Court of Justice to undo some of the difficulty here however.116 
 
D. LACUNAE IN THE ACQUIRED RIGHTS DIRECTIVE AND 
DELIBERATE FAILURES IN THE DIRECTIVE TO ADDRESS ISSUES 
DESPITE THE INEVITABILITY OF THESE ISSUES CAUSING 
DIFFICULTIES  
One aspect of the Acquired Rights Directive which has been difficult to 
overlook has been the number of lacunae and deliberate failures to address 
                                                 
113 A good example of this is seen in the decision of the House of Lords in Melon v. 
Hector Powe Ltd. [1981] 1 All ER 313. 
114 Case C-256/01 Allonby v. Accrington and Rossendale College [2004] ECR I-873 
115 See in this regard Case C-343/98 Collino and Chiappero [2000] ECR I-6659, in 
particular para. 40 of the Court’s judgment. 
116 Certainly Advocate General Poaires Maduro seemed to think so in the Opinion which 
he delivered in Case C-478/03 Celtec Ltd v. John Astley and Others [2005] ECR I-4389. 
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issues in the directive which it could clearly be foreseen would cause 
inevitable difficulties. Such omissions may well have occurred for the 
understandable reason that dealing with these issues would have been 
politically controversial enough with one or more member states to 
jeopardise the adoption of the legislation. Nonetheless, there existence is 
worthy of note, and the net effect of such omissions has been at times to 
make what is excluded from the Acquired Rights Directive as interesting 
as what is contained in it.  
A good example of one such omission is that the Directive as originally 
adopted in 1977 failed to give any indication whatsoever as to whether or 
not a contracting-out, much less a change of contractors, could constitute 
the transfer of an undertaking. Davies has observed that it  
cannot be argued …that the issue of contracting out…arose 
solely because of changes in the economic climate which 
occurred after the adoption of the Directive. The Community 
legislator may perhaps be forgiven for not foreseeing the extent 
to which contracting out would develop in the 1980s, but that 
there was here a significant legal problem was manifestly 
apparent at the time the Directive was adopted.117 
Similarly, the ongoing non-application of the Directive to share transfers 
has left a gaping hole through which the information and consultation 
requirements of the Directive have been capable of being safely avoided. 
Finally, given the importance of pensions to workers, it would be difficult 
to claim that the exclusion of the normal application of the Directive’s 
rules by Article 3(4) of the Directive itself in relation to “employees' rights 
to old-age, invalidity or survivors' benefits under supplementary company 
or intercompany pension schemes outside the statutory social security 
                                                 
117 P. Davies, “Transfers of Undertakings” in S. Sciarra (ed.), Labour Law in the 
Courts—National Judges and the European Court of Justice (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2001) 131 at p. 136. 
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schemes in Member States” is anything other than a gaping hole in the 
protection provided by the Directive.118  
It may be noted in passing that this lack of willingness to see politically 
controversial issues dealt with at European level is not always confined to 
national executives represented in the Council of Ministers. A similar lack 
of inclination could be witnessed in the failure of the House of Lords in 
Wilson v. St. Helens Borough Council [1998] ICR 1141 to refer the 
question of the precise implications of the provision of Article 4(1) of the 
Directive that “the transfer of the undertaking, business or part of the 
undertaking or business shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal 
by the transferor or the transferee”. 
 
E. LACUNAE, AMBIGUITIES AND FAILURES TO DEFINE CRUCIAL 
CONCEPTS USED IN THE DIRECTIVE LEADING TO AN ENLARGED 
CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE FOR THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
The existence of lacunae in the Acquired Rights Directive such as those 
just referred to leads on naturally to a further topic. For it is the existence 
in the past of certain of these lacunae is one factor which has led to an 
unusually strong law-making role being effectively delegated to the 
European Court of Justice in relation to the Directive. Thus the application 
of the Directive in situations of insolvency, although now a topic dealt 
with in the text of the Acquired Rights Directive itself, 119 follows in very 
large measure the course which had to be mapped by the Court of Justice 
                                                 
118 Even if qualified by the requirement under Article 3(4)(b) to adopt the measures 
necessary to protect the interests of employees and of persons no longer employed in the 
transferor's business at the time of the transfer in respect of rights conferring on them 
immediate or prospective entitlement to old age benefits, including survivors' benefits, 
under supplementary schemes. 
119 See Article 5 of Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of 
employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
undertakings or businesses. 
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at a time when the original Directive made no provision at all for this 
important topic (a course which, once determined by the Court, was later 
in large measure codified into the text of the Directive by the Community 
legislature). Similarly the approach of the Directive to contracting-out 
situations and to administrative reorganisations of public authorities, 
important and foreseeable topics, only came to be dealt with in the text of 
the Directive after the Court of Justice had been effectively forced to 
create the law on these topics in the absence of any real guidance from the 
legislature in the original Directive.120 
A further phenomenon which is to be seen in the Acquired Rights 
Directive consists of the pronounced and remarkable tendency to fail to 
define concepts which is to be seen in this instrument. The Directive for 
long lacked—and indeed, to some extent, still lacks—adequate definitions 
of important concepts used in the application of the Directive.121 This 
tendency originally extended to a concept as fundamental to the Directive 
as the notion of the transfer of an undertaking, and still extends to the 
issue of the consequences of a violation of the prohibition on transfer-
grounded dismissals, as well as the definition of “economic technical or 
organisational reasons entailing changes in the workforce”—reasons 
which can excuse a dismissal which would otherwise violate the Directive. 
Some such imprecision seems to have been due to a degree of 
                                                 
120 See now Article 1(1)(b) and 1(1)(c) of the Acquired Rights Directive, following the 
lead set by the Court of Justice in, respectively Case C-13/95 Süzen [1997] ECR I-1259 
and Case C-298/94 Henke [1996] ECR I-4989.  
121 Some such lacunae were at least in part remedied by the 1998 amendments to the 1977 
Directive. At that time, ideas which had earlier been developed by the Court of Justice of 
what, for example, constitutes a ‘transfer’ (see Case C-13/95 Süzen [1997] ECR I-1259) 
and (insofar as one may describe this as a separable issue) of what kind of body 
constitutes an ‘undertaking’ (see e.g, Case C-29/91 Dr. Sophie Redmond Stichting [1992] 
ECR I-3189, Case C-382/92 Commission v. United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2435 and 
Case C-298/94 Henke [1996] ECR I-4989) were written into the text of the Directive by 
the Community legislature. These amendments are now to be found in Article 1(1)(b) and 
Article 1(1)(c) of the consolidating Directive 2001/23/EC. But gaps remain: it would, for 
example, be difficult to describe the new definition of the transfer of an undertaking as a 
comprehensive one.   
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inadvertence on the part of the Community legislature.122 However, part of 
it has also been attributed to the Directive’s targeting of only partial 
harmonisation of Member State rules governing employment rights in 
transfer situations.123  
                                                 
122 A good example of such inadvertence is that the Directive as originally adopted in 
1977 failed to give any indication whatsoever as to whether or not a contracting-out, 
much less a change of contractors, could constitute the transfer of an undertaking. Davies 
has observed that it  
 “cannot be argued …that the issue of contracting out…arose solely because of changes in 
the economic climate which occurred after the adoption of the Directive. The Community 
legislator may perhaps be forgiven for not foreseeing the extent to which contracting out 
would develop in the 1980s, but that there was here a significant legal problem was 
manifestly apparent at the time the Directive was adopted.”  
(P. Davies, loc.cit., n. 118 above). In fairness, however, in considering any charge of 
inadvertence against the Community legislature, the value of deliberate vagueness in 
drafting as a technique to assist the achievement of political compromise should not be 
overlooked. 
123 Certainly, in Case 105/84 Danmols Inventar  [1985] ECR 2639, the Court of Justice 
declared it clear, on the basis of an examination of a number of provisions of the original 
1977 Directive, that the Directive was intended to achieve only partial harmonisation and 
held that it followed that the Directive’s protection should be available only to persons 
protected as employees under national law. (The original 1977 Directive said nothing on 
the topic of whether the concept of ‘employee’ should be given a Community definition 
or not.) A modified version of the Court’s position was later enshrined in the text of the 
Directive by the Community legislature. (See now Article 2, Paragraph (2) and Sub-
paragraph (1)(d) of Directive 2001/23/EC and see further concerning the definition of 
‘employee’ text infra.)  The Court has also found that where an employee declines to 
avail of his or her right under the Directive to continue the employment relationship with 
the transferee of the undertaking for which he or she works, it is for the Member State 
concerned, rather than for Community law, ‘to determine what the fate of the contract of 
employment or employment relationship should be’. (Joined Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 
and C-139/91 Katsikas [1992] ECR I-6577 at para. 35 of the Court’s judgment). Since 
1998, however, the discretion formerly accorded to national law as to how to deal with 
contraventions of the information and consultation requirements set out in the Directive 
has been limited by the general requirement that employees who consider themselves 
wronged by failure to comply with obligations arising from the Directive be enabled to 
pursue their claims by judicial process after possible recourse to other competent 
authorities. (See now Article 9 of the 2001 Directive). 
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Again, a corollary of this failure to provide necessary definitions has been 
the necessary development of a broad constitutional role for the Court of 
Justice in providing definitions needed in order to apply the Directive 
which would otherwise be lacking. Thus, for example, as has already been 
seen in the text above, the failure of the legislature to ascribe a meaning to 
the concept of undertaking for the purposes of the Directive forced the 
Court to do this instead (albeit that it initially vacillated over whether to 
use the entreprise-activité model or the entreprise-organisation one, before 
finally espousing the latter option).  
The level of ambiguity in the text of the Directive has had similar 
constitutional implications to the lack of definitions provided in the 
instrument, in that an important role (which has little counterpart at 
national level, certainly in common law countries 124) has in instances of 
legislative ambiguity fallen by default to the European Court of Justice 
Sometimes however, so great has been the level of difficulty created by 
the Community legislature that the Court has not been unable to resolve 
satisfactorily difficulties created. Thus e.g., the reference (varying in its 
meaning depending on which language version of the Directive is referred 
to) to transfers ‘as a result of a legal transfer or merger’ has to an 
increasingly pointless extent continued to be seen by the Court to require a 
context of contractual relations in order for any transfer to come within the 
scope of the Directive.125 The optimal solution to this difficulty—the 
unambiguous broadening by the Community legislature of the scope of the 
Directive to transfers effected ‘by contract or by some other disposition or 
operation of law, judicial decision or administrative measure’ was 
proposed by the Commission both in its 1994 draft Directive and in its 
revised 1997 proposal for a Directive amending the original Acquired 
Rights Directive. With somewhat depressing predictability, however, the 
                                                 
124 Although it may be more familiar in other legal systems such as the German, in which 
a relatively high political profile seems to be envisaged for the Bundesverfassungsgericht. 
125 See for example Case C-51/00 Temco Service Industries [2002] ECR I-969. 
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change did not however feature in the much-weakened version of the 
Directive ultimately adopted by the Council in 1998.126  
Another example of ambiguity which the Court has arguably been unable 
to resolve completely satisfactorily relates to the consequences for 
workers of exercising their supposedly fundamental right under the 
Directive—recognised by the Court in Katsikas 127—to object to their 
transfer under the Directive. In the event of any such objection, the Court 
held that it was for the Member States to determine what the fate of the 
contract of employment or employment relationship should be.128 One 
test of the Directive’s real value to employees, however, depends on 
whether it gives ‘objectors’ (who, it should be remembered may have very 
good grounds for their refusal to work for the transferee) the right to 
remain in the employ of the transferor, or, at the very least, to 
compensation for the loss of their right to employment with the transferor. 
                                                 
126 See Proposal for a Council Directive on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses (OJ C 274, 1.10.94, p. 10) at Article 1(1) 
thereof; Amended proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 77/187/EEC on 
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of 
employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
businesses (OJ C 124, 21.4.97, p. 48) at Article 1(1) thereof; and Council Directive 
98/50/EC of 29 June 1998 amending Directive 77/187/EEC on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event 
of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses (OJ L 201, 17.7.1998, p. 
88) at Article 1(1) thereof. The relevant provision is now Article 1(1) of Directive 
2001/23/EC (OJ L 82, 22.3.2001, p. 16). Note that some Member States have voluntarily 
applied the Directive to a wider category of employees than required by the Directive. 
See in this regard F. Valdés Dal-Ré “Transfers of Undertakings: An Experience of 
Clashes and Harmonies Between Community Law and National Legal Systems in S. 
Sciarra, Labour Law in the Courts: National Judges and the European Court of Justice 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2001) at 179. 
127 (Joined Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 and C-139/91) [1992] ECR I-6577. 
128 Para. 35 of the judgment of the Court. This position was refined somewhat in later 
case-law of the Court on this topic, but the basic position still holds true. 
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The Court in Katsikas,129 however—implicitly rejecting in this respect 
the Opinion offered to it by Advocate General Van Gerven 130— simply 
refused to involve itself in this area. Instead, the Court took refuge in the 
idea that this was an area in which the Directive espoused only partial 
harmonisation and left the matter largely in the hands of national legal 
systems.  
The lack of certainty as to the precise implications of the provision of 
Article 4(1) of the Directive that “the transfer of the undertaking, business 
or part of the undertaking or business shall not in itself constitute grounds 
for dismissal by the transferor or the transferee” is another zone of 
ambiguity not yet cleared up by the Court of Justice, although in this case, 
the responsibility is perhaps most appropriately laid at the door of national 
courts for their failure to refer the question to the Court of Justice under 
Article 234 of the EC Treaty.131  
 
F. A REQUIREMENT OF SUB-OPTIMAL INTERPRETATION? 
It is saying nothing particularly novel to observe that the European Court 
of Justice must pay careful attention to the question of whether national 
                                                 
129 Notwithstanding its reference to the fundamental right of the worker to choose his or 
her employer. 
130 Van Gerven AG advised finding that that Directive ‘does not prevent a Member State 
from conferring on employees the right to declare that the legal effects of a transfer of an 
undertaking are not to apply with regard to them, as a result of which their contracts of 
employment with the transferor will be maintained, provided that it is guaranteed - by 
means of an agreement between the employees and the employer or under a law, 
regulation or administrative provision within the meaning of Article 7 of the directive - 
that that right of objection is more favourable to employees, not only in principle but also 
in practice.’ (Emphasis added. See Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 and C-139/91 Katsikas 
[1992] ECR I-6577 at para. 22 of the Advocate General’s Opinion). 
131 See in this regard the ruling of the House of Lords in Wilson v. St. Helens Borough 
Council [1998] ICR 1141. 
 
 
46                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 03 NO. 05 
courts will follow its lead in any ruling. Autrement dit, the Court operates 
is subject to restraints in interpreting Community law. The Court’s 
decisions on direct effect,132 state liability,133 the interpretive obligation,134 
and arguably horizontal direct effect 135 all appear to have demonstrated a 
strong degree of  awareness on the part of the Court (were any such 
demonstration necessary) that the continued effectiveness of Community 
law depends on the cooperation of national courts. At times—as with the 
persistent refusal of the Court of Justice to view Directives as being 
capable of giving rise to horizontal direct effect—the Court can appear 
forced to adopt doctrinally sub-optimal interpretations of the law. It may 
well be that some of its jurisprudence in relation to the Acquired Rights 
Directive constitutes an example of this latter phenomenon. 
It is difficult to determine a single dominant reason for the Court’s change 
of approach in Süzen 136 from an entreprise-activité to an entreprise-
organisation conceptualisation of an undertaking (perhaps not least 
                                                 
132 Note the alteration in the legal basis offered by the Court for this doctrine between its 
decision in Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337 and that in Case 
148/78 Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti [1979] ECR 1629. 
133 Note the development in the basis offered by the Court for this doctrine from its 
decision in Case C-6/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy [1991] ECR I-5357 to that in C-
46/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur/ Factortame III [1996] ECR I-1029  
134 See in this regard in particular the decisions of the Court of Justice concerning the 
scope of this doctrine in Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacionale de 
Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135, Case C-334/92 Wagner Miret v. Fondo de 
Garantia Salarial [1993] ECR I –6911, Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori v. Recreb [1994] ECR 
I—3325 and Case C-192/94 El Corte Inglés v. Blázques Rivero [1996] ECR I-1281. 
135 In which deference to the lack of likelihood of finding acceptance on the part of 
member state’s courts is arguably as convincing an explanation as any for the refusal by 
the European Court of Justice to acknowledge that unimplemented Directives are capable 
of giving rise to horizontal direct effect (while accepting that they can give rise to so-
called incidental horizontal direct effect). 
136 Case C-13/95 [1997] ECR I-1259. 
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because the Court has never acknowledged that any such change occurred 
137). Certainly, the Court gave no reasons grounded in employee protection 
for its change. However, the Court’s re-evaluation of its approach in 
Süzen and resultant change did come in the face of hostility to the 
entreprise-activité approach from national governments, a lack of support 
for it either from the Commission or the Advocates General in either 
Schmidt or Süzen, academic criticism (far from all of which was justified), 
an absence of elucidation of powerful arguments in favour of the 
entreprise-activité approach, a lack of any strong Community interest in 
maintaining the entreprise-activité stance and finally, and perhaps most 
tellingly, a negative reaction from national courts, particularly in France, 
Germany and Italy.138 In the light of all of these factors, it would probably 
have been more surprising if Süzen was decided in a way other than that in 
which it was. Had the case been decided otherwise, the Court would 
undoubtedly have found itself in an isolated position. Nevertheless, Süzen 
is undoubtedly a ruling which has reduced considerably the value of the 
Acquired Rights Directive as an employment protection measure of 
relevance to vulnerable workers in contracting-out situations.  
 
                                                 
137 O’Leary has noted - accurately - that the Court did not overrule its previous case-law 
on what constitutes a transfer (S. O’Leary, Employment Law at the European Court of 
Justice (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) at 266). In real terms, however the Court’s ruling 
in Süzen involved a marked shift in approach. See for some suggestions as to why the 
Court changed its mind, P. Davies, loc. cit. at n. 118, p. 142. 
138 This reaction took different forms. In France and Italy, it involved what has been 
referred to as ‘passive dialogue’—the acceptance by national courts of unconvincing 
arguments that national law was in conformity with national law despite recent contrary 
case-law of the Court of Justice, and a consequent refusal to refer the matter to the 
European Court of Justice under what is now Article 234 of the EC Treaty. In Germany, 
it consisted of what has been termed ‘active dialogue’—the reference of a second or 
further case to the European Court of Justice involving the same basic issue, but 
accompanied by additional arguments, and constituting in effect an invitation to the Court 
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IV.   IMPLEMENTING ‘COMMUNITY LEGISLATION IN 
THE SOCIAL POLICY FIELD: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
IRISH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACQUIRED RIGHTS 
DIRECTIVE 
The present examination of the traditional method of Community 
legislation and of the process of social dialogue as mechanisms used to 
deliver Community employment law seems likely to be well served by 
venturing beyond the point of adoption of such laws at European level and 
examining how such measures subsequently fare at the point of 
implementation. Much of Community employment legislation adopted by 
the normal legislative route as well as several Article 139 social policy 
agreements have taken the form of, or been annexed to Community 
Directives, with a concomitant transposition obligation being imposed on 
national legal systems. How have such measures fared in practice? Some 
benefit may be derived by taking—once again—the experience of the 
Acquired Rights Directive as an example, and by considering how its 
implementation has proceeded in one member state. 
Ireland now implements the Acquired Rights Directive (in its latest 
embodiment139) by means of the European Communities (Protection of 
Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations, 2003.140 A study of 
the implementation of the Directive in Ireland was recently carried out by 
the writer as part of a recent international study for the European 
Commission, The Implementation and Application of EU Labour Law 
                                                 
139 The latest embodiment of which, as seen above, is _Directive 2001/23/EC on the 
approximation of laws of the member states relating to the safeguarding of employees’ 
rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses. 
140 Regulation 15 of these Regulations revokes both the original implementing 
Regulations, the European Communities (Safeguarding of Employees' Rights on Transfer 
of Undertakings) Regulations 1980 (S.I. No. 306 of 1980) (which had implemented the 
original Acquired Rights Directive, Directive 77/187/EEC) and the later European 
Communities (Safeguarding of Employees' Rights on Transfer of Undertakings) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2000 (S.I. No. 487 of 2000) which had substantially amended 
the 1980 Regulations. 
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Directives in the Enlarged European Union. Arising from that study, the 
following observations are offered in relation to the experience of 
implementation of the Acquired Rights Directive in Ireland as an example 
of the achievement of a policy in the social field via the use of a directive. 
How transferable to other Member States or to other policy contexts any 
lessons learned are is of course an open question, although it seems 
probable that at least some of them are.141 
 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
DIRECTIVE CHOSEN BY THE MEMBER STATE 
The effectiveness with which a European Community policy in the 
employment field which is sought to be implemented through the 
enactment of a directive is carried into effect seems likely—judging by 
Ireland’s experience with the Acquired Rights Directive—to be strongly 
affected by the means chosen by the member state to implement the 
directive. In Ireland, the choice of transposition means has traditionally 
comes down to one between the adoption of an Act of the Oireachtas, and 
the simpler, more expedient and yet less transparent and more 
democratically troublesome recourse to the adoption of Ministerial 
Regulations. The legal obligation to transpose large numbers of directives 
and give effect to various items of Community legislation has the result 
that in practice large numbers of statutory instruments are adopted each 
year in fulfilment of Ireland’s obligations under Community law—a 
situation which has been prevented from giving rise to constitutional 
difficulties only by virtue of a liberal interpretation by the Irish Supreme 
Court of when such recourse to Ministerial regulations is to be viewed as 
permissible in the context of the implementation of the requirements of 
European Community law.142 Historically, the less rigorous drafting 
                                                 
141 The publication of the study, which was carried out under the leadership of Middlesex 
University Business School, is likely to provide some information in this regard. 
142 See in this regard e.g., Meagher v Minister for Agriculture and Food and others [1994] 
I.R. 329 and Maher, Brett and Ryan v. Minister for Agriculture [2001] ILRM 481. 
 
 
50                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 03 NO. 05 
standards applied to the adoption of secondary legislation have resulted in 
various provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive being implemented 
through regulations which frequently repeat verbatim or almost verbatim 
the provisions of the Directive being implemented, however inappropriate 
this may have been.143 The results of the less demanding requirements of 
proceeding in this way appear to have been:  
(a) a failure to integrate properly the legislation implementing the 
Directive into the body of Irish employment law. One example of 
this is the provision of Regulation 5 (3) of the 2003 Regulations 
that “if a contract of employment is terminated because the transfer 
involves a substantial change in working conditions to the 
detriment of the employee concerned, the employer concerned 
shall be regarded as having been responsible for the termination of 
the contract of employment.” This is close to144 a verbatim 
reproduction of provision of Article 4(2) of the 2001 Directive. 
What it fails to make, however, is any effort to explain the key 
issue of whether the test to be applied in relation to the substantial 
change is to be a contract-based one or not.  
(b) the importation of uncertainty directly from the Directive into Irish 
implementing legislation. Thus, Regulation 3(1) of the 2003 
Regulations provides that the Regulations shall apply to any 
transfer of an undertaking, business, or part of an undertaking or 
business from one employer to another employer as a result of a 
legal transfer (including the assignment or forfeiture of a lease) or 
merger. Such a definition—largely identical to that found in 
Article 1 of the 2001 Directive—has had the advantage of helping 
to ensure that Irish legislation does not fall foul of the evolving 
standards required by the Directive. What it has not done is to 
provide sufficient guidance to employers or workers. Similarly, the 
stipulation in Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/23/EC that “the 
                                                 
143 The original implementing regulations (now happily repealed) were a particularly 
egregious example of this. See the European Communities (Safeguarding of Employees' 
Rights on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 1980 (S.I. No. 306 of 1980). 
144 The words ‘employment relationship’ found in the Directive are not repeated. 
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transfer of the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or 
business shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by the 
transferor or the transferee”  has been implemented in Irish law by 
the provision of Regulation 5(1) of the 2003 Regulations that “the 
transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or 
business shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by the 
transferor or the transferee and such a dismissal, the grounds for 
which are such a transfer, by a transferor or a transferee is 
prohibited.” This is probably the least well-drafted implementation 
of a provision of the 2001 Directive in Irish law. Thus the 
statement that a dismissal is prohibited seems to convey the 
impression that such a dismissal is void and yet in practice this 
does not seem to be how the measure is generally viewed as 
applying.145 
(c) the use of terminology (e.g., [the transfer of an undertaking] “as a 
result of a legal transfer”146, “dismissals for economic, technical or 
organisational reasons which entail changes in the workforce” 147 ) 
unfamiliar to Irish lawyers and either poorly defined or not defined 
at all. In fairness, some improvement has taken place over time 
with the elimination of the formerly confusing reference in the 
Irish implementing Regulations to an ‘employment relationship’ 
(as distinct from a contract of employment) and with the 
clarifications in the meaning to be attributed to “representatives of 
employees” for the purposes of the Regulations.148  
                                                 
145 See the brief discussion in the text below of the High Court ruling in Mythen v. 
Employment Appeals Tribunal, Butterkrust and Joseph Downes and Sons Ltd (in 
receivership) [1990] IR 98. 
146 Found in Regulation 3(1) of the 2003 Regulations. 
147 Regulation 5(2) of the 2003 Regulations. 
148 See now Regulation 2(1) of the 2003 Regulations, and note also the provisions of 
Regulations 7(2) and 8(5) thereof. 
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How inevitable all or any of these problems are depends on the standards 
applied in relation to the drafting of secondary legislation but it is difficult 
to believe that the necessarily punctilious approach to the drafting of 
legislation promoted by the prospect of scrutiny (the rigorousness of 
which is incentivised by the prospect of political gains for those involved) 
in the passage of primary legislation through a bicameral legislature is 
likely to be easily replicable in any less rigorous process of drafting of 
secondary legislation. 
 
B. THE POTENTIAL FOR DISRUPTION OF THE HARMONY OF A 
NATIONAL POLICY APPROACH IN RELATION TO A PARTICULAR 
ISSUE BY THE ENACTMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A 
DIRECTIVE 
A second phenomenon observable in the implementation of the Acquired 
Rights Directive is the potential for disruption of the harmony of a 
national policy approach in relation to a particular issue through the 
implementation of a directive.  
Perhaps the best example of this relates to the meaning attributed to the 
concept of “representatives of employees” for the purposes of the 
Regulations.149 Irish trade union law has for long focused on the policy 
goal of reducing the large number of unions in existence in this state. In 
pursuance of this policy, it has for long rendered illegal the conduct of 
collective bargaining with entities representing employees which do not 
constitute trade unions,150  staff associations or excepted bodies.151 Under 
                                                 
149 See now Regulation 2(1) of the 2003 Regulations, and note also the provisions of 
Regulations 7(2) and 8(5) thereof. 
150 Note that Regulation 2(1) defines "trade union" as meaning a trade union which holds 
a negotiating licence under the Trade Union Act 1941—a highly restrictive definition. 
151 See more generally in relation to this policy chapter 2 of T. Kerr and G. Whyte, Irish 
Trade Union Law (1985, Professional Books, Dublin). See the definitions of “trade 
union” and “excepted body” now provided in Regulation 2(1) of the 2003 Regulations. 
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the original Irish regulations which implemented the original form of the 
Acquired Rights Directive, the European Communities (Safeguarding of 
Employees' Rights on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations, 1980 152—
no definition at all was provided of the concept of representatives of 
employees, even though this concept was used in those Regulations. This 
implicitly had the effect of confining the concept to trade unions, staff 
associations or excepted bodies. Subsequently, however, the decision of 
the European Court of  Justice in Commission v. United Kingdom 153 
made clear that such a restrictive approach to the meaning of employee 
representatives was not consonant with the requirements of the Directive. 
Subsequent to the receipt of a reasoned opinion from the Commission 
which pointed out the difficulties with the then definition, the concept was 
expanded, in Regulation 4 of the European Communities (Safeguarding of 
Employees' Rights on Transfer of Undertakings) (Amendment) 
Regulations, 2000, to include “in the absence of such a trade union, staff 
association or excepted body, a person or persons chosen (under an 
arrangement put in place by the employer) by such employees from 
among their number to represent them in negotiations with the 
employer”.154 The 2003 Regulations maintained this arrangement with a 
marginal increase in specificity,155 and through the  stipulation in 
Regulation 8(5) that where there are no employees' representatives in the 
                                                                                                                         
Note that Regulation 2(1) of the 2003 Regulations defines "excepted body" as having the 
meaning assigned to it by section 6(3) of the Trade Union Act 1941.  
152 Statutory Instrument No. 306 of 1980 (implementing  Directive 77/187/EEC). 
153 Case C-382/92 [1994] ECR I-2435. 
154 It will be noted that this put the onus on the employer to put arrangements in place. 
155 Viz., by stating in Regulation 7(2) that where a transferred undertaking does not 
preserve its autonomy, it is the transferee who is bound by the obligation to make the 
referred-to arrangement, and by defining the group with the right to choose who should 
represent them as “employees transferred who were represented before the transfer”.  The 
increased specificity seems to stem from the word-for-word implementation of the 
Directive, however, rather than any conscious decision to change legal policy: Regulation 
7(2) simply mirrors the corresponding provision of Article 6(1) of Directive 2001/23/EC. 
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undertaking or business of the transferor/transferee, a procedure is to be 
put in place by the transferor or the transferee whereby the employees may 
choose from among their number a person or persons to represent them 
(including by means of an election) for the purposes of the Regulations.156 
It should be noted that the effect of the expansion beyond its original 
meaning of the concept of employee’s representatives has the effect that 
the 2003 Regulations effectively carve out an exception to a rule which is 
laid down by an Act of the Oireachtas (the parliament). The result of this 
is that—to an increasing extent, given the expansion of European 
legislation relating to employee consultation and information rights—that 
European law has become something of a cuckoo in the nest in relation to 
Irish trade union policy. Ireland, as a result of interventions including, but 
not confined to the Acquired Rights Directive, is simultaneously pursuing 
two inconsistent policies at the one time, one of them, domestic in origin, 
seeking to reduce the number of organisations or bodies engaging in 
discussions with employers on behalf of workers, the other actively 
promoting the setting up of such bodies.   
This may of course be argued to be the inevitable price (and, depending on 
the context, a fair price, at that) of integration through law 157—any law, 
                                                 
156 Regulation 8(6) makes a form of fall-back provision by stipulating that where, 
notwithstanding paragraph (5), there are still no representatives of the employees in an 
undertaking or business concerned (through no fault of the employees), each of the 
employees concerned must be given certain information in writing, where reasonably 
practicable, not later than 30 days before the transfer and, in any event, in good time 
before the transfer. 
157 There may be others. Such a centralised approach means that - together with any 
benefits associated a particular approach to any legal issue in addition to the benefits of 
centralisation itself - problems at the centre transmit themselves to the member states, a 
prime example in relation to the Acquired Rights Directive being the difficulties 
encountered by the European Court of Justice in determining the application or otherwise 
of the Directive in contracting-out situations, the law in relation to which was specifically 
pointed out to this writer by employer representatives interviewed as giving rise to 
considerable difficulties in practice. See for an article stressing such problems, T. 
Hartley, “The European Union and the Systematic Dismantling of the Common Law of 
Conflict of Laws” (2005) 54 ICLQ 813. 
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not just a directive, in any policy area, where that integration does not 
involve the complete the replacement of an entire body of domestic law in 
the relevant policy field. It is a phenomenon seen in other areas of law 
outside the social policy field (for instance, tort law, in which European 
law has intervened in the consumer protection area, or criminal procedure 
law in which the impact of the Third Pillar is now making itself 
increasingly felt). It is for all that a phenomenon which very visibly occurs 
in the context of the implementation of the Acquired Rights Directive and 
seems worthy of note here.  
 
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONTEXT PROVIDED BY THE 
SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF THE MEMBER STATE IN 
QUESTION 
Reference has been made above to the potential for disruption through the 
implementation of a directive of the harmony of national policy approach 
in relation to a particular issue. In the early days of the Acquired Rights 
Directive it might have seemed more realistic to allude to the experience 
of this Directive (at least in the United Kingdom and Ireland) as providing 
much stronger evidence of the potential for disruption of a European-wide 
approach by virtue of national implementation strategies than it provided 
for the potential for disruption of national policy choices in relation to 
particular issues. This was due to the well-known difficulties created by 
the narrowness of the United Kingdom definition (and implicitly the Irish 
definition also) of ‘employee representatives’. It took some time for the 
ruling of the European Court of Justice in Commission v. United 
Kingdom158 to reveal that the definition of employee representative chosen 
by the United Kingdom was unacceptably narrow for the purposes of the 
Directive. However, with this ruling, at least one source of evidence of the 
                                                 
158 Case C-382/92 [1994] ECR I-2435 
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disruptive potential for a European approach risked in the choice of a 
Directive as an implementing method has disappeared.159  
However, other evidence is provided by the experience of the Acquired 
Rights Directive of the susceptibility to national contexts of a European-
wide approach to a social policy issue pursued through the means of the 
enactment and transposition of a directive. Thus the context provided by 
the system of industrial relations of a member state in question can vitally 
affect the impact of a directive.  
The experience of the implementation of the Acquired Rights Directive 
regarding collective agreements reflects this. Regulation 4(2) of the 2003 
Regulations (repeating verbatim what is stated in the first indent of Article 
3(3) of the Directive) provides that “following a transfer, the transferee 
shall continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed in any collective 
agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor under that 
agreement until the date of termination or expiry of the collective 
agreement or the entry into force or application of another collective 
agreement.” The 2003 Regulations thus preserve the pre-transfer situation 
as regards transfers of collective agreements. 
                                                 
159 Or at least has been reduced to the risk of illegal behaviour on the part of a member 
state. 
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Because of the voluntarist nature of Irish industrial relations,160 however, 
in general, collective agreements are not legally binding. Thus the 
significance of Regulation 4(2) has been limited: the transferee’s 
continuing to observe the terms and conditions agreed in any collective 
agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor under that 
agreement imposes no greater legal constraints on the transferee than it 
does on the transferor—which is to say, in the normal event, none at all. 
The binding power of the collective agreement will in general depend on 
the extent of the collective bargaining power possessed by the workforce. 
This remains the case after as before the transfer.161  
The provision of the second indent of Article 3(3) of the Directive that 
Member States “may limit the period for observing such terms and 
conditions with the proviso that it shall not be less than one year” has not 
been taken up by the Irish 2003 Regulations: given the lack of binding 
force of collective agreements, taking advantage of this derogation was 
unnecessary for Ireland. It would have been possible to give legally 
binding force to collective agreements in the event of a transfer of an 
undertaking, but this in most cases would have involved a considerable 
                                                 
160 See generally chapter 6 of T. Kerr and G. Whyte, op. cit., at n. 52. For a more 
introductory view, see Chapter 7 of F. Meenan, Working Within the Law (second edition, 
1999, Oak Tree Press, Dublin). Kerr and Whyte, ibid., examine the exceptions to the 
general rule. It should additionally be noted that the general voluntarist nature of Irish 
industrial relations has been subject to some new statutory incursion in recent times. See 
now the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 2001 and the powers of intervention 
which it gives to the Labour Court where, for example, it is not the practice of an 
employer to engage in collective bargaining negotiations and the internal dispute 
resolution procedures (if any) normally used by the parties concerned have failed to 
resolve the dispute; or, for example, the employer has failed to observe a provision of the 
Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution. It should be noted that under s. 10 of 
the 2001 Act, the possibility exists of giving legally-binding force to determinations of 
the Tribunal by way of an order of the Circuit Court.  
161 It is possible, although not inevitable, that the underlying balance of power in the 
workplace may be disturbed by the fact of, for example, a transfer of part of an 
undertaking—and the balance of collective bargaining influence may tilt in favour of or 
against the workforce. This is not something which either the Directive or the 
Regulations attempt to address, however. 
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enhancement of the legal rights of workers far above what they enjoyed in 
the pre-transfer situation.  
There appears to be little evidence that Regulation 4(2) of the 2003 
Regulations is making any difference in practice. A representative of the 
Irish Congress of Trade Unions interviewed by this writer was adamant 
that if there is a trade union presence in the workplace in the first place, it 
is this presence and not the existence of Regulation 4(2) which will ensure 
the survival of collectively agreed arrangements. He was unable to recall 
one case in which a union had been de-recognised subsequent to a 
transfer. It is perhaps for this reason that the non-insertion of the one year 
time limit has occasioned no controversy: the lack of a time limit is 
scarcely felt because Regulation 4(2) itself has had no real impact. An 
Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation interviewee agreed that 
unionisation of the transferor made a huge difference as regards awareness 
of rights under the Regulations and their ability to apply pressure to 
protect their members’ interests. 
Apart from the situation regarding collective agreements, further evidence 
of the importance of the context of industrial relations of a particular 
member state as regards the implementation of provisions of social policy-
related directives is arguably given by the relatively poor results which 
have been attained by the information and consultation     
The trade union view expressed in interview to this writer was that 
employers in Ireland frequently tend to adopt a casual approach to the 
information and consultation requirements under the Regulations. 
Interviews with employer representatives conducted by the writer tended 
to bear this out, with the feeling that this phenomenon is particularly the 
case where small employers are concerned, where the employer often 
knows his workforce personally, has a somewhat entrenched manner of 
dealing with it and may well feel a formalised information and 
consultation process to be superfluous and e.g., information conveyed by 
letter to suffice. A typical example of where this might happen might be 
when the original owner of the business is retiring or selling the business. 
A trade union interviewee also pointed out that there is also a serious 
question as to whether worker will bother to enforce the Regulations in a 
given situation, given the relatively small awards of compensation 
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available to each individual, with this tendency being particularly 
pronounced in non-unionised employment. 
The trade union view as expressed to this writer is that any information 
workers obtained under the Regulations may be useful but the information 
legally required by the Regulations is insufficient to render the assistance 
required to obtain what the trade unions see as sufficient participation 
rights in decision-making. The trade unions attitude seems to be that 
consultations should be required about whether the transfer should take 
place at all, whether it is right for the enterprise, the owners and the 
employees and whether the decision to transfer should be changed or 
reversed. Further, trade unions feel that information and consultation 
should be with a view to reaching an agreement. (Such an extensive 
participation rights are not required by the Directive, at present, however.) 
Further, the trade union view was that employers do not take the 
consultation process, where this applies, as seriously as they ought to, with 
the general approach of employers being one of making their minds up as 
to what they intend to do before ever consulting with employees, with any 
consultation tending to be very focused on the basis of how the transfer 
can be facilitated. Thus the decision regarding the transfer is felt to be 
regarded by employers as essentially one to be taken on a unilateral basis 
with employees being informed and consulted only after the basic decision 
has been made. Interviewed trade unionists argued that participation rights 
should not act in this way as a mere regulatory burden to be borne on the 
way to the goal of effecting a transfer, but rather as a process which can 
put the transfer itself in question, a view which, however, is not reflected 
in the terms of the Directive.  
Although of course the extent of consultation varies, the trade union view 
was that what normally happens is employers normally take a very 
minimalist approach, addressing only what they are prepared to address. 
Remedies are for breach of the obligations imposed by the Regulations are 
seen by trade unions as inadequate.162 One trade union interviewee 
expressed the view that the attitude adopted by Irish employers was 
                                                 
162 A question discussed further in the text below. 
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different to that in countries such as Germany and France where there is a 
context of co-determination, and that with the voluntarist system industrial 
relations system which applies in this jurisdiction, that it was more a case 
of getting from employers only what they could be compelled to give. 
This was described to the writer as a cultural factor, born out of the 
industrial relations system. 
 
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONTEXT PROVIDED BY THE 
DEGREE OF COLLECTIVE ORGANISATION OF THE INDUSTRY OR 
WORKPLACE IN QUESTION 
If the Irish experience of the Acquired Rights Directive shows that the 
system of industrial relations of a member state in question can vitally 
affect the impact of a directive, it also shows that the degree of collective 
organisation of the industry or workplace in question can also be a major 
factor in the implementation of a directive in the employment law field. 
The context of the particular industry and in particular whether it is 
unionised or not seems to count for much—both in determining the extent 
to which rights supposedly granted by the Directive will be vindicated (for 
without unionisation, workers are unlikely to find out about the rights 
which they supposedly enjoy) and in determining the extent to which such 
rights will be enhanced.  
An example of this is to be found in outsourcing (also referred to as 
‘contracting out’ or ‘vertical disintegration’) situations.The trade union 
view as expressed to this writer in interview was that there was some 
evidence that in certain labour intensive industries, workers are not being 
retained in outsourcing situations, but rather are being let go by their 
employer any time a contract is not renewed. This was confirmed (at least 
in relation to the extent that such behaviour is not illegal) by the 
observation by an employer organisation interviewee that in contract-
cleaning and other contract service industries, a lot of employers would be 
very aware of the case-law and would be aware that avoiding the transfer 
of staff would avoid the application of the Regulations and would act 
accordingly. On the other hand, the point was made by a trade union 
interviewee that a lot of the larger cleaning companies are unionised, 
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which improves the level of protection of workers’ rights (awareness of 
rights etc) in such undertakings, although independently of the application 
of the Regulations. IBEC confirmed that where workers on a contract are 
unionised (as many are, particularly in the cleaning sector, where many 
workers are members of SIPTU, the largest union in the Republic), 
incoming contractors have on numerous occasions been compelled to take 
on the existing staff particularly by pressure being put on the party to 
whom the service is being provided (such as threats to picket etc.) 
particularly where this party is in the (highly unionised) public sector. 
Unions may also succeed in having the particular needs of employees met. 
Many in the cleaning industry would be on the minimum wage, and 
working only part-time and might not want to work on another contract in 
a location which would involve them incurring travelling expenses etc. A 
trade union interviewee argued that unionisation can actually help 
employers to retain contracts as the union can act as a channel of 
communication between the employer and employees if competitive 
pressures render matters difficult for the enterprise, and facilitate 
workplace adjustments necessary to keep the contract. 
Ironically, among the legal rights conferred by the Directive which are 
most affected in practice by the context of unionisation or lack thereof is 
the right to the representatives of the employees affected by a transfer to 
the preservation of their status and function. Regulation 7 of the 2003 
Regulations—following fairly closely the wording of the relevant 
provision of the Acquired Rights Directive itself 163— provides that 
where an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or 
business the subject of a transfer, preserves its autonomy after 
the transfer, the status and function of the representatives or of 
the representation of the employees affected by the transfer 
                                                 
163 Article 6(1) of the Directive states that “if the undertaking, business or part of an 
undertaking or business preserves its autonomy, the status and function of the 
representatives or of the representation of the employees affected by the transfer shall be 
preserved on the same terms and subject to the same conditions as existed before the date 
of the transfer by virtue of law, regulation, administrative provision or agreement, 
provided that the conditions necessary for the constitution of the employee's 
representation are fulfilled.” 
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shall be preserved by the transferee concerned on the same 
terms and subject to the same conditions as existed before the 
date of the transfer as specified in any enactment, or in any 
agreement between the employer and the employees' 
representatives. 
Irish trade unions see this provision of the Regulations as having made 
little if any difference in practice. An Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
interviewee could think of no case where collective bargaining 
arrangements had been set aside by the new employer. However, he felt 
that this had nothing to do with the regulations, but rather with industrial 
relations realities.164 It may be that the Regulations have some 
independent or reinforcing effect, however: an IBEC interviewee reported 
that non-unionised employers were being advised by IBEC that they are 
legally obliged to accept collective bargaining rights if these existed in a 
transferred undertaking.  
As regards the consultation and information requirements imposed under 
the Directive, the trade union view as expressed to this writer in interview 
was that the fact of union representation in a transfer situation makes a 
very considerable difference, with, in this situation, the requirements of 
the 2003 Regulations acting as a bottom line—the very minimum that 
unions will expect an employer to do. The view was expressed that where 
there is collective representation employers will do more than is required 
by the 2003 Regulations because they will want to effect the transfer with 
the least possible trouble for themselves.  
 
                                                 
164 The same interviewee pointed out (correctly) that the Regulations have no role in 
extending collective bargaining rights in the transferred unit where they have not 
previously existed. Interestingly, an IBEC interviewee confirmed that where workers on a 
contract are unionised (as many are, particularly in the cleaning sector, where many 
workers are members of SIPTU, the largest union in the Republic), the incoming 
contractor will frequently be compelled to comply with the Regulations and take on the 
existing staff particularly by pressure being put on the party to whom the service is being 
provided (such as threats to picket etc.) particularly where this party is in the (highly 
unionised) public sector. 
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E. THE CRUCIAL NATURE OF SANCTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT 
MECHANISMS, WHERE A CHOICE IS MADE TO IMPLEMENT A 
PARTICULAR SOCIAL POLICY BY WAY OF COMMUNITY 
DIRECTIVE 
The experience of the Acquired Rights Directive in Ireland testifies 
eloquently to the importance of the question of sanctions and enforcement 
mechanisms, where a choice is made to implement a particular social 
policy by way of the adoption and then transposition at national level of a 
Directive.  
As regards sanctions, a good example of the difficulties which can be 
given rise to by inadequate provision concerning sanctions relates to the 
dismissal prohibition in the Regulations, which has already been adverted 
to in the text above. Under Regulation 5(1) of the 2003 Regulations “the 
transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business 
shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by the transferor or the 
transferee and such a dismissal, the grounds for which are such a transfer, 
by a transferor or a transferee is prohibited.” As noted above, this 
provision is unfortunately worded in that it seems to convey the 
impression that such a dismissal is void. Indeed in the cases of Brett and 
others v. Niall Collins Ltd.(in receivership) and Oyster Investments Ltd 
trading as Fotoking 165 and again in Harte v. Gendrum Enterprises Ltd.166,  
the Irish Employment Appeals Tribunal took the view that a dismissal 
contrary to the provisions of the 1980 Regulations (the wording of which 
has not been altered in the equivalent provision of the 2003 Regulations) 
was prohibited by the Regulations and a nullity. Although these decisions 
do not reflect the general approach followed either by the EAT or by the 
Irish courts since, or (for some time) before (with the normal practice 
having subsequently been to regard such dismissals as effective 
dismissals, albeit contrary to the Unfair Dismissals Acts), they are 
illustrative of the difficulties which can be created by inadequate provision 
                                                 
165 [1995] ELR 69 
166 RP 351/2001 
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for sanctions in national legislation implementing Community 
employment law. Indeed, an even better illustration is the fact that for 
several years, under the original Irish implementing legislation 167—which 
did not contain the provisions found in the 2003 Regulations regarding the 
role of rights commissioners—the dismissal provision, which is a crucial 
provision both in the structure of the Regulations and in the attainment of 
the goals of the Directive, was largely moribund in Irish law. Matters 
changed only when the Irish High Court expressed the view in Mythen v. 
Employment Appeals Tribunal, Butterkrust and Joseph Downes and Sons 
Ltd (in receivership) 168 that dismissal in breach of the Irish implementing 
Regulations was to be regarded as a violation of unfair dismissals 
legislation and that therefore the application of the relevant Regulations 
came within the jurisdiction of the Employment Appeals Tribunal.169  
Another example of difficulties capable of being occasioned by the 
inadequate provision of sanctions concerns the information and 
consultation provisions of the Directive and implementing Regulations. 
The view was expressed by trade union representatives that in many the 
remedies for breach of the information and consultation provisions are 
viewed as insufficiently large to create a disincentive. Employers are 
frequently not greatly concerned about being caught and fined lightly. The 
existence of this attitude on the part of some employers (particularly small 
employers) was confirmed in other interviews conducted by the writer. 
Breaches of the information and consultation provisions do however 
attract a potential award of compensation of up to four weeks 
                                                 
167 The European Communities (Safeguarding of Employees' Rights on Transfer of 
Undertakings) Regulations 1980 (S.I. No. 306 of 1980). 
168 [1990] IR 98. 
169 Even now, some residual uncertainty remains as to the precise legal status of a 
dismissal contrary to the Regulations, although most of this uncertainty originates in 
European Community law, since there has been considerable ambiguity in the rulings of 
the Court of Justice on this point. See in this regard, e.g., the rulings of the Court in Case 
101/87 P. Bork International [1988] ECR 3057 at para. 18 thereof, and more recently, 
Case C-51/00 Temco Service Industries [2002] ECR I-969 at para. 28 thereof. 
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remuneration,170 and the view of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment officials interviewed by this writer was that given that such 
an award could be made in favour of each affected employee, this was a 
substantial remedy and that going much beyond it could pose risks of 
putting transferor or transferee enterprises out of business. The level of 
remedies follows the precedent of earlier Irish employment legislation.  
The remedies issue does not merely affect the attitude of employers. Trade 
union interviewees noted that that it is often in question as to whether a 
given worker will go to the trouble of attempting to enforce the 
Regulations insofar as these concern anything other than dismissal, given 
the relatively small awards of compensation available. In practice, it 
would seem that trade union representation makes a very great difference 
in terms of securing compliance with the legislation, but if employment is 
unionised, reliance on sanctions is less necessary to secure compliance 
with the Regulations.  
As regards the enforcement mechanism provided by Irish law in order to 
assure compliance by transferors and transferees in relation to the 
Acquired Rights Directive, difficult and almost inevitably unsatisfactory 
choices have had to be made. To some extent the government appear 
caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Reliance on the 
Employment Appeals Tribunal has tended to meet condemnation from 
trade unionists on the basis of an allegedly over legalistic approach. The 
alternative—and what in the future will be the ascendant 171—approach of 
reliance on rights commissioners, however, although more acceptable to 
trade unionists, seems deeply problematic in terms of securing adequate 
                                                 
170 Regulation 10(5) of the 2003 Regulations 
171 See in this regard now the most recent national social partnership agreement, Towards 
2016 - Ten-Year Framework Social Partnership Agreement 2006-2015 (2006, 
Department of the Taoiseach, Dublin) 
 (available online at 
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached_files/Pdf%20files/Towards2016PartnershipAgreem
ent.pdf) at parag. 15.11 thereof). 
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enforcement of the aims of the Directive, something which has attracted 
the criticism of representatives of IBEC interviewed by this writer. 
Under Article 9 of the Directive, Member States are required to introduce 
into their national legal systems such measures as are necessary to enable 
all employees and representatives of employees who consider themselves 
wronged by failure to comply with the obligations arising from the 
Directive to pursue their claims by judicial process after possible recourse 
to other competent authorities. Regulation 10(1) of the 2003 Regulations 
accordingly provides that a complaint that an employer has contravened 
any of the 2003 Regulations 172 in relation to an employee may be 
presented to a rights commissioner either by the employee, or by a trade 
union, staff association or excepted body on behalf and with the consent of 
the employee. A decision of a rights commissioner under paragraph (4) 
must do one or more of the following: declare that the complaint is well 
founded or not; require the employer to comply with the Regulations and, 
for that purpose, to take a specified course of action; or require the 
employee to pay such compensation as the Rights Commissioner thinks 
just and equitable in the circumstances.173 A party concerned may appeal 
(normally only within a six week period 174) to the EAT (attendance 
before which can be compelled 175) from a decision of a rights 
commissioner under Regulation 10.176  
                                                 
172 With the exceptions of other than Regulations 4(4)(a) and 13. 
173 In the case of a contravention of Regulation 8, this may not exceed 4 weeks 
remuneration and, in the case of a contravention of any other Regulation, it may not 
exceed 2 years remuneration. See generally regarding all the foregoing Regulation 10(5) 
and (6). 
174 Regulation 11(2). 
175 Regulation 13(3). This is in contrast to the position regarding rights commissioners.   
176 Regulation 11(1) of the 2003 Regulations. The Tribunal may affirm, vary or set aside 
the decision of the rights commissioner. Under Regulation 12(1), a question of law may 
be referred to the High Court by the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment from 
the EAT proceedings. Note that  
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The trade union view of rights commissioners is much more approving 
than their view of the Employment Appeals Tribunal, and the fact that 
unlike the EAT, Rights Commissioners will act as mediators, facilitating 
the settlement of cases (for instance by the payment of sums by way of 
compensation) appears to meet with their approval. An ICTU interviewee 
argued the need for institutions for the vindication of employment rights 
generally to be more “user-friendly, more concerned with people than with 
process”.177 
The trade union view was that “the EAT is a very cold place for 
employees to vindicate their rights” by its very nature and because its rules 
of procedure, involving formal procedures such as the taking of evidence 
on oath, the possibility of cross-examination by a senior counsel of a 
worker (who may be a migrant worker with a poor grasp of English and 
who—in particular if he or she does not come from unionised 
employment—may be unrepresented) make it so. It was argued that 
Tribunal has evolved in effect into a court, something it was not meant to 
be from the outset (as one can see from its lack of power to award costs), 
and that the fact that its chairpersons were solicitors and barristers had 
helped to make this the case. This combined with what trade unions see as 
the relatively low amount of compensation available to each worker even 
if they succeed with a claim is viewed by the trade unions as a strong 
                                                                                                                         
the Circuit Court can be involved at enforcement level, too. 
177 This corresponds with the Rights Commissioners own view of themselves. According 
to the Labour Relations Commission Annual Report 2004 (P.R.N. A5/0741, June, 2005) 
at p. 26 and 28 thereof 
 
  “the nature of referrals has gradually changed the role of the Rights Commissioner from a 
function solely within the industrial disputes arena to a combination of that role with that 
of a quasi-judicial role in respect of employment rights. Rights Commissioners now deal 
with pay, holidays, working conditions, contracts and pensions in an enhanced role 
beyond that as originally envisaged in the establishing legislation. As part of their role in 
deciding on claims and complaints, the Rights Commissioners also have, by statute, the 
authority to mediate in matters before them.” 
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disincentive to bringing a claim,178 as is the fact that even if they succeed 
they will have to pay a large proportion of what they have been awarded to 
an advocate, if they have chosen to be represented. Unsurprisingly, a 
Report of the ICTU’s Employment Rights Group has recommended 
compulsory first instance recourse to Rights Commissioners. 
If there is a positive side to the use of Rights Commissioners, however, 
there is also a negative one. Hearings before Rights Commissioners are 
held in private, and there is a serious lack of transparency regarding the 
grounds on which Rights Commissioners reach their decisions. Adequate 
records of these grounds are not being kept or at least are not being made 
available in the public register of decisions, making it impossible to tell 
why remedies were awarded or refused or why the remedy awarded in one 
case is greater than the remedy awarded in the next.179 A thorough perusal 
of such records as are contained in the Register did not make it clear that a 
proper understanding of the regulations is held by all Rights 
Commissioners. No case-law whatsoever of any sort, either Irish or 
European has ever been cited in any decision since records began with the 
coming into force of the 2000 Regulations and there is no evidence from 
these records that Rights Commissioners are even aware of such case-law. 
Furthermore, Rights Commissioners are appointed on the nomination of 
the social partners—with, somewhat remarkably, no legal knowledge or 
qualification being required of them in order for appointment as a Rights 
Commissioner, even though, according to the Labour Relations 
Commission Annual Report 2004 180 upwards of 75% of what they now 
have to do—including their application of the 2003 Regulations—involves 
the application of legal rights and obligations. As the quotation from the 
Annual Report of the Labour Relations Commission in the text above 
                                                 
178 It was pointed out that the legal maximum of two years earnings is rarely awarded. 
179 It should be noted that permission to photocopy any of the contents of the register of 
decisions which is required under the Regulations is invariably refused (and was refused 
even to this writer, although permission was granted to visually inspect the public register 
itself). 
180 Labour Relations Commission Annual Report 2004 (P.R.N. A5/0741, June, 2005) at 
p. 26 and 28 thereof. 
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makes clear, notwithstanding the fact that the role of Rights 
Commissioners is coming to be increasingly dominated by the need to 
apply legislation, their role originated as an industrial relations one and it 
appeared to this writer that these origins continue to colour their approach 
to the application of the law, and not always in a positive manner. 
Anecdotal evidence provided in interviews to this writer suggests that the 
goal of the successful mediation of a settlement between the parties is at 
least on occasion given primary importance, over and above the correct 
application of the terms of the Regulations. However, it should be 
emphasised that in the absence of anything approaching an adequate level 
of transparency, it is difficult to form any certain conclusions. Although it 
should be stressed that the Irish Congress of Trade Unions is happy with 
the service provided by Rights Commissioners, most particularly on the 
basis of the relative lack of formality of its procedures, the lack of 
transparency associated with the process makes it impossible to verify that 
the remedy provided by the Rights Commissioners service provides an 
effective vindication of the rights granted under the Directive. 
IBEC’s view as expressed to this writer in interview is that some kind of 
authoritative forum interpreting the legislation is needed. It is felt that the 
whole transfer of undertakings area is sufficiently complex that cases 
involving these issues should not be brought before Rights 
Commissioners, but rather that the first instance should be the 
Employment Appeals Tribunal and then appeals be brought to the Circuit 
Court where a solid body of guiding case-law could build up in contrast 
with what IBEC feels are the inconsistent decisions of the EAT.181 
Familiarity with European case-law (e.g., whether it was settled or not) on 
the part of the adjudicating body is felt to be necessary on the part of 
IBEC and this is one of the reasons they are generally dissatisfied with the 
extent of the jurisdiction which has been given to Rights Commissioners 
not just under the 2003 Regulations but under other employment 
legislation. IBEC’s view is that if legislation is invoked then problems 
should be dealt with systematically in terms of what the legislation 
provides, and claims established by reference to the legislation. The 
                                                 
181 Although even here, the general lack of reporting of Circuit Court decisions at present 
is also felt to be problematic, making it difficult to find out what has happened in an 
individual case unless one has contact with one of the parties. 
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approach of rights commissioners by contrast is felt to be primarily an 
industrial relations problem-fixing approach rather than a more 
appropriate legal one which would be primarily concerned with the 
accurate determination of entitlements under the Regulations. 
Furthermore, there is felt to be a lack of consistency as between the 
approaches of different Rights Commissioners.  Ideally, IBEC would feel 
that rights-based issues should be taken out of the hands of Rights 
Commissioners entirely and dealt with by the EAT, with interest-based 
issues dealt with by the Labour Court. 
 
F. THE USE OF A FORM OF SOCIAL DIALOGUE IN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF EMPLOYMENT-RELATED DIRECTIVES IN 
IRELAND. 
In the context of a paper discussing the use of the social dialogue in the 
social policy field, it is of interest to note that a domestic process of social 
dialogue has existed for some years in Ireland, and that, at least in the 
context of the implementation of the Acquired Rights Directive, this 
process has been intimately linked with the transposition of social policy 
directives. Thus it is of interest to note that it was in Sustaining Progress, 
the national social partnership agreement negotiated and entered into in 
2003 between the government, and the social partners and covering the 
years 2003-2005,182 that the Government committed itself to transposing 
the mandatory provisions of Directive 2001/23/EC by means of 
Regulations, by March 2003. In a further extension of the dialogue 
process, the Government explicitly undertook to consult the social partners 
on those provisions  of the consolidated Directive which member states 
had an option either to implement or not (e.g. the pension interests of 
transferred employees) and undertook that it would then consider what 
required to be implemented by way of primary legislation.183 According to 
                                                 
182 Sustaining Progress - Social Partnership Agreement 2003-2005 (2003, Government 
Publications Office,  Dublin) 
183 Sustaining Progress - Social Partnership Agreement 2003-2005 (2003, Government 
Publications Office, Dublin), paragraph 10.8, p. 79. It is understood that according to 
legal advice provided by the Attorney General (based, it may be surmised, on the rulings 
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Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment interviewees, it is in 
any case standard practice under national social partnership agreements, 
that the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), the Irish Business and 
Employers Confederation (IBEC) and any government department which 
might have an interest 184 are consulted in relation to proposals, a process 
which is seen as carrying with it the advantage of avoiding political 
difficulties in the Oireachtas.  
As regards the form of the consultation process in relation to employment 
legislation such as the 2003 Regulations, the first point which can be made 
is that the length of time given to it will vary according to the context or 
difficulties involved. There were meetings in the Department of 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment with IBEC and ICTU prior to the 
adoption of the 2003 Regulations. An IBEC interviewee noted that IBEC 
makes both written and oral submissions and of lobbying the Department 
of Enterprise, Trade and Employment in relation to important new 
legislation. As regards ICTU, draft regulations were sent for comment and 
ICTU were given a number of weeks to send their comments in, having 
shown it to its constituent members. Comments were duly sent to the 
Department. Individual trade unions were not consulted by the 
government, which channels its consultations via ICTU, but ICTU 
consulted them before sending in its own views. 
According to information provided by the Department of Enterprise, Trade 
and Employment, subsequent consultations have been engaged in 
regarding the provisions of the Directive which it is optional for each 
member state to implement, although it would seem that this particular 
process—undertaken in fulfillment of the Government’s explicit 
undertaking in the Sustaining Progress agreement to consult the social 
                                                                                                                         
of the Supreme Court in Meagher v Minister for Agriculture and Food and others [1994] 
I.R. 329 and Maher, Brett and Ryan v. Minister for Agriculture [2001] ILRM 481) the 
optional provisions of the Directive must be implemented by primary legislation by virtue 
of the requirements of Article 15.2.1° of the Irish Constitution. 
184 Thus the Department of Social and Family Affairs and the Department of Finance 
were consulted in relation to the 2003 Regulations before they were adopted. 
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partners regarding the optional provisions of the Directive 185 —was of a 
fairly rudimentary nature. At the end of 2003, letters were sent by the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment to ICTU and IBEC who 
replied to these, although, according to Department of Enterprise, Trade 
and Employment interviewees, there were optional provisions of the 
Directive in respect of which no comments were received by the 
Department.186 It would appear that no ongoing consultations concerning 
the Regulations have been engaged with either IBEC or ICTU apart from 
this.187 
The results of this ‘social dialogue’ approach to implementation seem 
somewhat mixed. On the one hand, implementation of the Directive has 
been politically uncontroversial and has taken place in a context of 
consensus, and some of the credit for this must be attributed to the social 
dialogue processes which have led to its implementation, both in the the 
national social partnership agreement and subsequently . On the other 
hand, the fact that the Department appears to require consensus before it 
will propose or adopt implementing legislation may be seen as an 
Achilles’ heel to the process. Hence, for example, the government’s 
approach of transposing by primary legislation only such optional 
provisions of the Directive as can be agreed upon as desirable by the 
social partners has given an effective veto to the IBEC, the national 
employers’ organisation over the implementation of all optional provisions 
of the Directive, with no incentive to negotiate. The result is that to date, 
                                                 
185 Sustaining Progress - Social Partnership Agreement 2003-2005 (2003, Government 
Publications Office, Dublin), paragraph 10.8, p. 79. 
186 Among the issues which the social partners did comment upon were the issues of 
pensions, and the option under Article 3(1) of the Directive of providing for joint and 
several liability on the part of transferor and transferee, as well as the option under 
Article 3(2) of the Directive of compelling  the transferor to notify the transferee of the 
rights and obligations to be transferred. 
187 ICTU organised a seminar for its own members on the Regulations on 27 May 2003 at 
the Gresham Hotel Dublin when the Regulations were published at which academic 
speakers and a speaker from the Department spoke. This allowed what was felt by the 
Department to be a useful exchange of views between the Department and ICTU. 
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only one of the several such optional provisions has been implemented.188 
Similarly, although explicit reference was made to the topic of pension 
interests of transferred employees in the Government’s undertaking in the 
Sustaining Progress agreement to consult the social partners on the 
optional provisions of the 2001 Directive,189 the ICTU’s expressions to the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment of its deep 
dissatisfaction with the present legal position regarding pension rights in 
transfer situations have had little effect up to the time of writing.190 
 
                                                 
188 In accordance with Article 3(2) of the 2001 Directive, s. 21_ of the Employees 
(Provision of Information and Consultation) Act, 2006, now imposes on the transferor of 
an obligation to notify the transferee of all rights and obligations which will be 
transferred to the transferee, so far as those rights and obligations are or ought to have 
been known to the transferor at the time of transfer. In contrast, no reliance has been put 
on the options provided e.g., by Article 4(1) of the Directive, Article 3(1), Article 3(4)(a), 
Article 5(1) and (3) or Article 7(5). 
189 Sustaining Progress -Social Partnership Agreement 2003-2005, op. cit., n. 186, 
paragraph 10.8, p. 79. 
190 On the other hand, it must be acknowledged there is a broader debate on pensions 
going on in Ireland at the moment, including over the issue of whether pension provision 
should be made compulsory and there seems to be a reluctance on the part of the 
Department to deal with the legal position on pensions in the particular context of transfer 
situations before the pensions issue generally is addressed, or to go further than is 
envisaged in the 2005 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Improving the Portability of Supplementary Pension Rights. (COM(2005) 
507 final, Brussels, 20.10.2005). Fears were also expressed that compelling transferees to 
assume responsibility for (expensive) defined benefit pension schemes and for possibly 
insolvent pension schemes would be likely to deter transfers altogether, and in this way 
work against the ultimate interests of employees in preserving their employment with the 
undertaking being transferred. 
